University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers

Working Papers

2008

The Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudication
Jonathan Remy Nash

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/public_law_and_legal_theory
Part of the Law Commons

Chicago Unbound includes both works in progress and final versions of articles. Please be
aware that a more recent version of this article may be available on Chicago Unbound, SSRN or
elsewhere.
Recommended Citation
Jonathan Nash, "The Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudication" (University of Chicago Public Law
& Legal Theory Working Paper No. 219, 2008).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Working Papers at Chicago Unbound. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers by an authorized administrator of
Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 409
(2D SERIES)
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 219

THE UNEASY CASE FOR TRANSJURISDICTIONAL ADJUDICATION
Jonathan Remy Nash

T H E LA W SC HO O L
T H E UNIVERSI TY OF CHICAGO

June 2008

This paper can be downloaded without charge at the John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics Working Paper Series: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html and at the
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series:
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html
and The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1142984.

94 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008)

THE UNEASY CASE FOR TRANSJURISDICTIONAL
ADJUDICATION
Jonathan Remy Nash†
Federal courts often decide cases that include matters of state law, while state
courts often decide cases that raise matters of federal law. Most of these cases are
decided within the court system in which they originate. Recent commentary advocates
more transjurisdictional adjudication through the expanded use of existing procedural
devices, and development of new devices. Some commentators endorse greater use of
certification by federal courts, while others advocate greater use of transjurisdictional
procedural devices to increase the availability of a federal forum to resolve federal legal
issues. In this Article, I call for refinement of this approach and argue that
commentators have overlooked several looming obstacles. First, the ability of state
courts to resolve issues of state law and federal courts issues of federal law relies upon
the erroneous assumption that issues of federal and state law are readily separable.
Second, the use of transjurisdictional procedural devices that send back to state court
state law issues that federal courts otherwise would decide run the risk of admitting state
court bias, or the appearance of bias, against out-of-state litigants. Third, commentators
underestimate the extent to which transjurisdictional adjudication relies upon
cooperation between court systems. Identifying these obstacles leads to a fuller
recognition of the costs and benefits of transjurisdictional adjudication, which in turn is
useful as a metric against which to measure existing and proposed transjurisdictional
procedural devices and as an aid in refining existing devices.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Federal courts are often called upon to decide cases that include matters of state
law, while state courts often are called upon to decide cases that raise matters of both
federal and state law. The vast bulk of these cases are decided within the court system in
which the cases originate, without the benefit of input from the other court system as to
how to resolve the legal issues that arise under the other legal system. In these cases of
“intersystemic adjudication,”1 the court system that decides the case will try to resolve
“foreign” legal questions in the way that the other court system would. The court system
will consider cases issued by the other court system that have addressed the issue in
question.
Recent commentary by academics and judges suggests that the best way to
resolve these cases is to have the court system definitively resolve those issues that arise
under that court system’s “native” law. These commentators advocate expanded use of
existing transjurisdictional procedural devices, and development and use of new devices.
For example, Professor Bradford Clark argues for greater use of certification by federal
1

Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2005) (defining “intersystemic adjudication” as “the interpretation by a court operating
within one political system of laws of another political system,” and describing the phenomenon as
“pervasive”).
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courts to allow state courts to resolve state law issues,2 while Professor Barry Friedman
advocates greater use of what I shall refer to as “transjurisdictional procedural devices”3
and in particular for greater availability of a federal forum to resolve federal law issues.4
In this Article, I call for refinement of this approach. I argue that the
commentators have overlooked several looming obstacles.
First, the ability of state courts to resolve issues of state law and federal courts
issues of federal law presupposes that the issues of federal and state law are readily
separable. This presupposition masks several difficulties. First, at least in cases that raise
intertwining issues of federal and state law, the federal and state law issues must be
disentangled. But how is this to be done? Who is to do it? What if the federal and state
courts disagree as to the proper disaggregation of the case? And, once the case is
decomposed, should the court that is called upon, purportedly, to respond to particular
issues of law simply address those legal issues, or ought it to opine upon the proper
ultimate resolution of the entire case?
Second, the desirability of having state courts resolve state law matters assumes,
if implicitly, that state courts will get questions of state law “correct”—or at least that
they will be more likely to get them “correct” than federal courts. In fact, however, as the
constitutional inclusion and the continued congressional authorization of federal diversity
jurisdiction suggest, it may well be that state courts’ susceptibility to bias against out-ofstaters might render them less able than federal courts to resolve state law questions
“correctly.”
Third, commentators underestimate the extent to which the successful use of
transjurisdictional procedural devices relies upon cooperation between court systems, and
overestimate the extent to which courts in different systems have incentives to, and in
fact will, cooperate.
These obstacles are not simply important in the abstract. First, these obstacles
have manifested themselves in practice. Second, the discussion of the obstacles leads to a
2

See infra text accompanying notes 32-40.
I use the terminology “transjurisdictional procedural device” to refer to a procedural device that
involves the judiciary of more than one judicial system. I choose the term so as clearly to distinguish
Professor Schapiro’s use of “intersystemic adjudication,” which he means to refer to courts in a single
judicial system interpreting the law of another judicial system. See supra note 1.
3
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fuller recognition of the costs of transjurisdictional adjudication, and of the potential
benefits of intersystemic adjudication. I identify three categories of costs and benefits that
should be, but as a general matter have not been, fully incorporated into benefit-cost
evaluations.
First, the obstacles themselves translate into costs in the implementation of
transjurisdictional procedural devices. They may act to make particular applications of a
device costly, and in the long run to sour courts on particular devices and to discourage
their use.
Second, commentators often tend to extol the virtue of affording court systems the
opportunity to resolve questions arising under the system’s native law. While this is
clearly a benefit offered by the use of transjurisdictional adjudication, commentators have
sometimes tended to elevate this benefit to the exclusion of other benefits. In reality, our
federal system also reflects other values, as I now discuss.
Third, so attracted have commentators been to the apparent benefits of
transjurisdictional procedural devices that they have tended to downplay the benefits of
intersystemic adjudication. But intersystemic adjudication offers numerous benefits,
including dialogue among court systems, and the opportunity for multiple courts to try to
interpret the law “correctly.”
This fuller understanding of costs and benefits is useful as a metric against which
to measure existing and proposed transjurisdictional procedural devices. It is also useful
as an aid in refining existing devices. As an illustration, I describe how one might refine
the current procedure by which federal courts certify questions of law to state high courts.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I provide an overview of court
systems’ authority to decide issues of law arising under their own “native” law. I also
discuss how courts usually decide such issues without input from the other judicial
system, but also discuss methods that allow for a court in the other system directly to
resolve those questions native to that court system.
In Part III, I describe various commentators’ proposals for new, and expanded use
of existing, transjurisdictional procedural devices. In Part IV, I discuss obstacles to the

4

See infra text accompanying notes 44-52.

Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudication

5

implementation of these proposals that the commentators have either overlooked or
undervalued.
In Part V, I build upon the discussion in the previous Parts to suggest a fuller
understanding of the costs and benefits of transjurisdictional procedural devices. I use
that understanding to evaluate commentators’ proposals, and then as a guide in refining
existing certification procedure.

II.

RESOLVING ISSUES ARISING UNDER ANOTHER SYSTEM’S LAW
State courts are often called upon to decide matters of federal law,5 and federal

courts are often called upon to decide matters of state law.6 Both state and federal courts
also may be called upon to decide cases in which state law causes of action implicate
issues of, or are intertwined with, federal law,7 or federal law causes of action that
implicate issues of state law.8
There are a few procedural devices that afford opportunities for transjurisdictional
dialogue and adjudication. First, the Supreme Court has the power to review, by
5

See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990). For a discussion of early state
court practices interpreting federal statutes, see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of
Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1529-48 (2006).
While settings in which courts of one state endeavor to discern the law of a sister state raise questions
analogous to those I address here, they lie beyond the scope of this Article.
6
See generally Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court “Federal” Decisions: A Study
in Interactive Redish, 19 GA. L. REV. 861, 898-99 (1985).
First, the federal diversity jurisdiction authorizes, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (d) (2006)—indeed,
demands, see Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943)—that federal courts hear some cases in
which issues of state law alone arise.
Second, federal courts often hear state law causes of action that are supplemental to causes of action that
arise under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006).
Third, it is possible that federal and state law issues are intertwined: state law might incorporate or
implicate federal law, see, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 309
(2005), or federal law might incorporate or implicate state law, see, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508-09 (2001) (holding that “federal common law governs the claimpreclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in diversity,” and that the common law rule
incorporates state law); 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2006) (incorporating state criminal law into federal criminal law on
federal enclaves located within the state).
7
For example, states often interpret state constitutional provisions to incorporate the legal standards of
their federal analogs. For discussion of the difficulties faced by federal courts when they are called upon to
interpret such state constitutional provisions, see Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State
Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409 (1999).
8
For example, the Court has held that the question of whether the Takings Clause applies to a property
interest is not resolved by reference to the Takings Clause, but rather by reference to some independent
source of law, such as state law. See, e.g., Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998).
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discretionary grant of certiorari, state courts’ determination of federal law.9 In a case in
which some issues arise under state law and others under federal law, the Supreme Court
will consider only those issues that arise under federal law (or, to the extent that the grant
of certiorari is narrower, some subset thereof).10
In order for the Court to review the case, the losing party must petition for a writ
of certiorari, and then the Court must accept that petition and determine the scope of
review.11 The state court has no discretion to request Supreme Court review,12 nor to
deny review if the Court chooses to review the case. Further, remedies are available to
the Court to address a state court’s failure to abide by the Court’s mandate.13
Two transjurisdictional procedural devices offer federal courts the opportunity to
obtain direct feedback from the state court system as to the resolution of state law issues:
abstention and certification. Under abstention, the federal court abstains from proceeding
forward with the case in federal court to allow a pending state court case that will resolve
the state law issues in the federal court case, or to allow the parties to file such an action
in state court. If the parties ask the federal court to retain jurisdiction over any remaining
federal issues (and probably even if they object to the state court’s attempt to resolve
federal issues), the state court’s jurisdiction will be limited to resolving the state law
9

See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006).
See, e.g., Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1408 (“In exercising its appellate authority over state courts, . . .
the U.S. Supreme Court does not generally review questions of state law.”).
In Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875), the Court indicated that Congress
cannot constitutionally confer upon the Supreme Court the power to review state court resolutions of state
law. The constitutional basis for this holding, however, is somewhat dubious. See, e.g., Martha A. Field,
Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 920 (1986). For arguments in
favor of broader Supreme Court authority to review state courts’ determinations of state law, see Henry
Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1919 (2003); John Harrison, Federal Appellate Jurisdiction Over Questions of State Law in State Courts, 7
GREEN BAG 2D 353 (2004). .
11
See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006). For a discussion of the evolution over time of the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction to review state court decisions from mandatory to discretionary, and of the change in the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction away from the restriction that it could only review denials of federal rights,
see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 466-68 (5th ed. 2003).
12
Like any lower court, a state high court may attempt to “signal” the Supreme Court that the case is
worthy of review. See Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Speaking Up: A Model of Judicial
Dissent and Discretionary Review (unpublished manuscript, available on SSRN).
13
See generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 11, at 481-83. On the topic of state court evasion of
Supreme Court mandates, see, for example, Note, Evasion of Supreme Court Mandates in Cases Remanded
to State Courts Since 1941, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1251 (1954); Note, Supreme Court Evasion of United States
Supreme Court Mandates, 56 YALE L.J. 574 (1947).
10
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issues.14 The most commonly used form of abstention, Pullman abstention,15 is available
only in cases where resolution of the state law questions might relieve the court of the
need to confront unclear issues of federal constitutional law.16 While there are other forms
of abstention that can apply in pure diversity cases, these abstention devices are quite
limited in scope.17
Certification is a procedural device that achieves the same result as abstention.18 It
is available in cases in which Pullman abstention can be invoked and—since, unlike
Pullman abstention, certification is not unavailable in pure diversity cases—certification
is available in more cases than Pullman abstention. Certification is also more streamlined
than Pullman abstention.
Either or both parties to a pending federal court lawsuit may request that the
federal court initiate certification proceedings, or the federal court may do so sua
sponte.19 If certification is to be used, then the federal court identifies the issues of state
law that it wishes the state high court to resolve and certifies those questions to the state
court.20 The state high court has discretion to accept or reject the certification request.21
In particular, state courts will tend to deny certification requests where the factual record
is insufficiently developed; this is in order to minimize the possibility that the state

14

See England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415-19 (1964) (discussing right of party
to federal court case where court has abstained pending resolution of state court case to reserve issues of
federal law for resolution in federal court).
15
Pullman abstention is named for the case that first recognized the doctrine, Railroad Commission of
Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
16
See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943) (holding that Pullman abstention is unavailable
in cases where no federal law issue is present). The applicability of Pullman abstention in cases where the
resolution of state law issues would obviate the need to decide an unclear subconstitutional federal law
issue. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of State Law,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1683 n.33 (2003) (discussing Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949)).
17
See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial
Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1517-24 (1997) (discussing Erie-based abstention,
including Burford and Thibodaux abstention).
18
In one way the result achieved under certification is even greater: Under certification it is guaranteed
that the state high court will resolve the state law issue definitively (assuming that court agrees to answer
the certified questions). By contrast, because state high courts generally retain the discretion to deny review
of lower state court rulings, a state high court might never hear the case under abstention, with the lower
state courts effectively providing resolution.
19
See generally Nash, supra note 16, at 1690, 1692.
20
See id. at 1692-93.
21
See id. at 1693.
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court’s answers will prove, once the record is developed, to be mere advisory opinions.22
The state court also is free to rephrase the certified questions if it believes another
phrasing would be more appropriate.23 Once the state court answers the certified
questions, the federal court resolves the case with the benefit of those answers.24
Certiorari review, abstention, and certification thus provide opportunities for
transjurisdictional adjudication.25 These devices are limited, however, in terms of both
scope and current use. Typically, then, state courts must resolve federal law issues
without help from the federal judiciary,26 and federal courts must resolve state law issues
on their own.27 Judicial and legislative action may change this, however. The Supreme

22

See id. at 1694 & n.82.
See id. at 1694 n.80. The parties to the federal court case are generally allowed to file briefs with, and
argue before, the state high court. See id. at 1694 & n.81.
24
See id. at 1695-96.
25
These devices are among the few situations in which direct federal-state transjurisdictional dialogue
and interaction are possible. See, e.g., Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 903
(1st Cir. 1988) (en banc) (“The certification process is the only opportunity for direct dialogue between a
federal and a state court.”). Cf. Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts: Changing
Contexts, Selective Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 171, 205 (1995) (“Federal and
state judges in charge of ‘All Brooklyn Navy Yard’ asbestos cases literally sat in the same room, jointly
convening a ‘state and federal court’ and ruling together on issues.”). Although one might also include
habeas cases in this mix, habeas cases are in the nature of collateral review rather than direct dialogue.
Removal of cases to federal court is more complicated. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006). Removal of
federal question cases allows federal courts to resolve issues arising under federal law. The removal will
generally apply to the entire case, however, so that state courts will lose the ability to resolve issues of state
law to the extent the case raises such issues. But cf. id. § 1441(c) (allowing for removal of “the entire case”
“[w]henever a separate and independent [federal question] claim or cause of action . . . is joined with one or
more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action,” but also empowering federal court to remand
“all matters in which State law predominates”). Moreover, the removal of cases grounded in diversity is
designed to deny state courts the power to resolve questions of state law. Other removal statutes also open
the doors of federal jurisdiction to claims arising purely under state law. See, e.g., id. §§ 1441(d) (allowing
for removal of “[a]ny civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state”), 1442(a) (allowing for
removal of “[a] civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court” against the United States,
an agency thereof, and certain federal officers and officials).
26
See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 825 (2005); Bellia, supra note 5. State courts are bound by Supreme Court precedent on federal law,
and also by any decisions on federal law by a higher-ranked state court whose decisions would ordinarily
be binding upon the state court. The state court also might look to lower federal courts’ interpretations of
state law and interpretations of courts of other states, both of which might be persuasive. See State v.
Knowles, 371 A.2d 624, 627-28 (Me. 1977) (“[E]ven though only a decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States is the supreme law of the land on a federal constitutional issue, nevertheless ‘in the interest of
developing harmonious federal-state relationships it is a wise policy that a state court of last resort accept,
so far as reasonably possible, a decision’” of the federal court of appeals within the geographic circuit of
which the state lies on a federal constitutional question. (quoting State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647, 667 (Me.
1973) (Wernick, J., concurring))).
27
See, e.g., Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1421 (“State courts cannot review a federal court’s interpretation
of state law.”).
23
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Court has suggested that federal courts make greater use of certification,28 and recent
legislation that will allow more cases that raise state law claims to be heard in federal
courts29 likely will increase the occasions on which federal courts will seek to certify
questions of state law. Greateruse of certification may also result from the Court’s recent
reaffirmance, in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering &
Manufacturing,30 that federal question jurisdiction extends beyond cases in which a claim
formally arises under federal law and reaches state law claims that incorporate some
aspect of federal law.31 Many legal commentators would applaud such changes, as I
explain in the next Part.
III.

PROPOSALS FOR EXPANDED USE OF TRANSJURISDICTIONAL PROCEDURAL
DEVICES

Most state courts resolve federal law questions without the benefit of Supreme
Court enlightenment and, analogously, federal courts resolve state law questions without
the benefit of abstention or certification. Recent commentary has disparaged this
approach. Whether by expanding the use of certification and parties’ ability to reserve
issues for review by a court in a particular system, or by fundamentally altering and
intermixing the plumbing of the state and federal judicial systems, commentators
advocate the increased use of and reliance upon, and the development of new,
transjurisdictional procedural devices. In this Part, I briefly survey some of these
suggestions. In the next Part, I suggest obstacles that these commentators have
overlooked or underestimated.

The Court’s decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938), mandates that federal
courts decide state law issues in accordance with the laws of the state, as set out by the state legislature and
judicial system.
28
See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76-79 (1997); Barry Friedman, Under the
Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1211, 1254 (2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court has indicated it expects wider use of certification procedures.”).
29
See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 9-12 (Feb. 18, 2005)
(amending the federal judicial code to allow jurisdiction in federal court over certain class actions based
upon minimal diversity; codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)).
30
545 U.S. 308 (2005).
31
For discussion, see, for example, Lonny S. Hoffman, Intersections of State and Federal Power: State
Judges, Federal Law, and the “Reliance Principle”, 81 TUL. L. REV. 283, 290-308 (2006); Richard D.
Freer, Of Rules and Standards: Reconciling Statutory Limitations on “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 82 IND.
L.J. 309, 333-36 (2007).
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Citing inherent problems in all possible approaches to federal courts’ endeavors to
fulfill their obligation under Erie to estimate state law,32 Professor Bradford Clark
advocates implementing a presumption in favor of having federal courts certify questions
of state law to the appropriate state high courts.33 He suggests two methods by which
federal courts might attempt to divine state law and finds all of them wanting. Under the
“static approach,” the federal court should “adjudicate the rights and duties of the parties
without regard to novel rules proposed by the parties, but not yet recognized
authoritatively by an appropriate organ of the state.”34 Professor Clark finds the static
approach problematic in that it “may lead federal courts to continue to apply existing
rules of decision even after state courts are prepared to abandon them,”35 and thus allow
for the “perpetuat[uation of] outmoded principles of state law by simultaneously drawing
cases into federal court and depriving state courts of opportunities to adopt novel rules of
state law.”36 By contrast, under what Professor Clark refers to as the “predictive
approach,” the federal court "attempts to forecast the development of state law by asking
what rule of decision the state's highest court is likely to adopt in the future.”37 According
to Professor Clark, “a federal court’s ‘prediction’ of state law frequently devolves into
little more than a choice among competing policy considerations.”38 In light of these
deficiencies with the static and predictive approaches, Professor Clark endorses expanded
use of certification39 through, in particular, the implementation of “a presumption
favoring certification of unsettled questions of state law.”40
Judge Guido Calabresi, too, calls for expanded use of certification, imploring
federal judges to “certify, certify, certify.”41 “In other words,” he explains, “I believe that
whenever there is a question of state law that is even possibly in doubt, the federal courts
32

See Clark, supra note 17, at 1495-1517, 1535-44.
See id. at 1556-63.
34
Id. at 1537.
35
Id. at 1541.
36
Id. at 1541-42.
37
Id. at 1497. Professor Clark elucidates that federal courts might rely on the predictive approach to
predict novel state law causes of action, see id. at 1502-08, predict novel state law defenses, see id. at 150813, and predict that existing state law precedent will be overruled, see id. at 1514-16.
38
Id. See generally id. at 1498-1501.
39
See id. at 1543-44.
40
Id. at 1556. See generally id. at 1556-63.
33
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should send the question to the highest court of the state, and let the highest court of the
state decide the issue as it wishes.”42 But Judge Calabresi endorses certification in a form
slightly different from its current appearance: He believes that, as a prerequisite to
certification, the federal court should write an opinion resolving the relevant state law
issue as it believes it should be resolved. The state high court then can treat the federal
court opinion as it would an opinion of a lower state court on the issue: It can choose to
grant the request for certification and address the question itself, or it can choose to deny
the certification request and let the federal court opinion stand (with the state high court
denial of certification presumably having whatever preclusive effect a discretionary
denial of review ordinarily has under state law).43
In a similar vein, Professor Barry Friedman assails what he calls “either-or”
thinking—that is, that a court (and the associated judicial system) must resolve the
entirety of all cases before it.44 He explains that to require federal courts to resolve state
law issues devalues state court interest in resolving those issues, and vice versa.45
Professor Friedman endorses increased use of certification.46 In addition, he advocates
expanded use of England reservation doctrine.47 In particular, he describes an
“anticipatory” England reservation doctrine, under which parties in a state action could
reserve federal issues when a case could be brought in federal court, even if in fact there
is no pending federal court case.48 He explains that “[f]ederal jurisdiction should be
available for federal claims.”49 Thus, “[s]o long as the state party indicates at the outset
41

Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1293,
1301 (2003).
42
Id. (footnote omitted). Judge Alex Kozinski, by contrast, recommends restricting the use of
certification to a far narrower setting. He argues: “[T]hat a case raises difficult legal questions is not
enough. . . . Certification is justified only when the state supreme court has provided no authoritative
guidance, other courts are in serious disarray and the question cries out for a definitive ruling.” Kremen v.
Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
43
See Calabresi, supra note 41, at 1301-02.
44
See Friedman, supra note 28, at 1216.
45
See id. at 1216-26.
46
See generally id. at 1255-56. Professor Friedman explains that “[c]ertification creates some additional
delay and expense, but not a great deal, especially considering the benefits of obtaining an authoritative
ruling.” Id. He appears not to go so far as Professor Clark’s presumption in favor of certification. See id. at
1276 (“[M]ost diversity cases do not require certification; their disposition rests on state law that is
sufficiently settled.”).
47
See id. at 1269-74.
48
Id. at 1271.
49
Id. at 1269.
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that it intends to obtain litigation of federal questions in federal court, that reservation
should be enough.”50 While recognizing that the increased use of transjurisdictional
procedural devices will impose some costs on the judicial system and litigants,51
Professor Friedman concludes that the benefits outweigh those costs.52
Judge Jon Newman has gone a step farther. Among a series of procedural reforms
designed to address what he identifies as an overburdened federal judiciary53 is the
suggestion that, as a matter of discretion, state law issues that arise in federal trial courts
could be appealed to state intermediate—and then high—courts, and that federal law
issues that arise in state trial courts could be appealed to federal courts of appeals and
then the United States Supreme Court.54 Judge Newman would vest discretion to
administer the system in federal appellate judges; that is, federal circuit judges would
decide both whether to allow appeals from state trial courts to federal courts of appeals,
and also would have an effective ‘right of refusal’ as to appeals from federal trial
courts.55 He also explains that such “[a] discretionary system of reciprocal routing of
appeals need not be limited to entire cases, but should permit review of single issues as
well.”56 Thus, for example, “[d]iscretionary access to federal appellate courts might well
be limited to the federal issues in the state court litigation.”57
50

Id.
Professor Friedman assesses the costs by considering the number of cases implicated, see id. at 127677, the need for more judges to get up to speed on cases and issues, see id. at 1277, litigation redundancy,
see id. at 1277-78, and litigant preference, see id. at 1278-79. Below I identify costs that commentators,
including Professor Friedman, seem to have overlooked or at least undervalued. See infra Part V.A.
52
See id. at 1279.
53
See Jon O. Newman, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: Proposals to Preserve the Federal Judicial
System, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 761-67 (1989) (lamenting the increase in federal court caseload, and
arguing that the increase has deleterious effects on the quality of federal judges, the quality of federal
judges’ performance, and on the functioning of federal courts).
54
See id. at 774-76.
55
Judge Newman explicates:
Administering a system of reciprocal routing of appeals should be a task for federal appellate
judges. For federal law claims, they should have the discretion to permit federal court appeals
from cases relegated to state courts. As with the decision to grant access to the federal trial court,
the appellate access decision would be accomplished without factfinding and would be
nonreviewable. For state law claims, if it is not acceptable to route all diversity appeals to state
courts, then federal appellate judges would at least have discretion to deny an opportunity for
federal court appeal in selected diversity cases and leave them for review within the pertinent
state appellate system.
Id. at 775.
56
Id.; see id. at 775-76.
57
Id. at 775.
51
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Taken as a group, these commentators endorse increased availability of federal
judicial fora to resolve questions of federal law, and of state judicial fora to resolve
questions of state law. The trend in commentary—by both legal academics and judges—
is to “resolve” the problem of having one judicial system guess at the proper resolution of
a question of law arising under the law native to the other judicial system by increasing
reliance upon, and developing new, transjurisdictional devices. In the next Part, I
highlight problems that these commentators have either underestimated or overlooked
entirely.
IV.

OBSTACLES TO EXPANDED USE OF TRANSJURISDICTIONAL PROCEDURAL
DEVICES
In the previous Part, I described a trend among commentators that supports both

the increased use of existing transjurisdictional procedural devices, and an expansion of
the pantheon of available transjurisdictional devices. The commentators, however, either
overlook or underestimate the problems associated with the design and use of these
devices will encounter. In this Part, I elucidate these problems.
First, transjurisdictional procedural devices raise important, yet underappreciated,
problems with respect to decomposition of cases into constituent issues. Second, state
courts may not manipulate state law when at least one of the parties hails from out-ofstate. Third, commentators overlook the importance of whether the effectiveness of
transjurisdictional devices is—and should be—based upon voluntary cooperation and
comity, as opposed to disparities in power. I address each of these problems in turn.
A. Decomposition of Cases
Commentators who advocate the introduction of new transjurisdictional devices
and the expanded use of new and existing transjurisdictional devices tend to assume that
the decomposition of cases into constituent state and federal issues is readily achievable.
Indeed, most commentators simply gloss over this step. In reality, however, in the hardly
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atypical case in which issues of state and federal law intertwine,58 the step is substantial,
complicated, and potentially controversial.59 Consider the several questions that the
decomposition of cases implicitly raises.
The first question is who is to perform the decomposition (or at least to decide
upon the proper decomposition). The federal court? The state court? The court that
originally enjoys jurisdiction? The court whose help is sought?60
The question also arises (and is obviously influenced by the answer to the first
question) as to how the case is to be decomposed. The decomposition of cases into
constituent issues can be complicated and raise challenges even in cases that arise under
the law of a single sovereign.61 The complications and challenges are even greater in the
context of cases that raise questions of state and federal law that intertwine.62
Third, once the case is decomposed, and constituent issues are sent by one court
system to another, should the court system to which constituent issues are sent simply
resolve those issues—i.e., respond to the particular questions of law that are raised—or
should it speak to what it believes would be the proper resolution of the underlying case
(or both)? And, along similar lines, once the court that sent the constituent issues to the
58

E.g., Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention
Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1084 (1974) (noting that “the two legal systems are often intertwined in
a particular case”).
59
See Redish, supra note 6, at 899 (“[B]ecause of the long tradition of interactive federalism, state and
federal law cannot always be so easily separated.”).
60
Note that the answer to these questions well may implicate the concerns of comity, and of power
disparity, that I discuss below. See infra Part IV.C.
61
First, consider the degree to which attorneys attempt to “frame” the issues that a case presents to a
court. Indeed, because the choice of issues allows for the manipulation of the result, efforts to decompose
cases into issues can fall prey to strategy. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A
SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 111-24 (2000); Maxwell L. Stearns,
How Outcome Voting Promotes Principled Issue Identification: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and
Others, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1996).
Second, on rare occasions, tallying judges’ votes on an issue-by-issue basis, as opposed to an outcome
basis, may, paradoxically, yield different results. See generally Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive
Voting Protocol Paradigm for Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75 (2003) (discussing cases of
doctrinal paradox).
It is interesting to note that, much as the availability of interlocutory appeals functions as a natural issue
decomposition device, see id. at 84-85, so too do cases that traverse the divide between the federal and state
judicial systems offer an example of “natural” issue decomposition.
62
The fact that issues of state and federal law must be separated and decided by different courts means
that these issues must be decided sequentially. See Bruce Chapman, Law, Incommensurability, and
Conceptually Sequenced Argument, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1487 (1998) (describing the importance of the
sequence of decisionmaking to legal argument); see also Bruce Chapman, The Rational and the
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other court receives back the other court’s opinion(s), ought it simply to use the
resolutions of the constituent issues to resolve the entire case, or should it take into
account the views of the other court (whether expressed implicitly or explicitly) as to the
proper resolution of the entire case?
Decomposition poses difficulties across the range of transjurisdictional procedural
devices.

Certification.— It might seem at first that certification presents an easy setting for state
courts, in that the certifying federal court will state precisely the questions to be asked
and the state court simply answers those legal questions. Such a view is grounded on
fundamental misapprehensions about the workings of certification. In important ways, it
is the case, and not just the certified questions, that goes to the state high court. That
state high courts as a rule decline certification requests absent a sufficiently developed
factual record shows that state courts answer—and, indeed, will only answer—certified
questions in context.63 And the parties to the actual case submit briefs to, and argue the
case before, the state high court.64 Thus, certification procedure in practice is far removed
from consideration of abstract legal issues in a vacuum. In addition, the state courts
remain free to rephrase the questions asked by the federal court,65 leaving at least some
power of decomposition in the hands of the state courts.
The difficulties of issue decomposition in certification cases come to a head
where state courts are asked to deal with certified questions of state law that arise
precisely because certain answers to the certified questions (but not others) will avoid
federal constitutional issues. Consider the common setting in which a federal court is
called upon to determine the federal constitutionality of a state statute. The federal court
certifies to the state high court the question of how the state statute should be interpreted.
Lurking (at least in the background) is the constitutionality of the statute. Indeed, the state

Reasonable: Social Choice Theory and Adjudication, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 41 (1994) (emphasizing the
importance of path dependence in legal reasoning).
63
See supra text accompanying note 22.
64
See supra note 23.
65
See supra text accompanying note 23.
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court will be fully aware that the issue of the proper interpretation of the state statute has
arisen in the context of the constitutionality of the statute.
One possibility is for the state court to consider the likely constitutionality of the
statute in determining the interpretation of the statute. While the state court generally will
recognize explicitly that it lacks authority to resolve issues of federal law, the state court
opinion may nonetheless make reference to federal law, and in substance reveal how the
state court believes the state law questions should be resolved in light of federal law.
Consider Redgrave v. Boston Philharmonic Orchestra,66 where the issue arose in a
federal case as to whether a particular application of a state statute would violate the First
Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit certified
interpretive questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; the questions were
broadly worded and did not mention or allude to the federal constitutional issues.67 A
fractured state court produced three opinions, none of which garnered a majority of votes.
All three opinions answered the questions as phrased on their face, but then proceeded to
note concerns, grounded in federal and/or state constitutional law, that the federal case
(though not the certified questions standing alone) raised.68 The federal court then
divided over whether to accept the answers to the certified questions at face value, or
whether to consider the state court judges’ musings on the broader case, ultimately
deciding that it would.69
Consider as well the response of the Maryland Court of Appeals to a certified
question in Telnikoff v. Matusevitch.70 At issue in Telnikoff was the enforceability under
Maryland law of a British libel judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the
66

855 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1988) (en banc), incorporating answers to certified questions provided by 502
N.E.2d 1375 (Mass. 1987).
67
See id. at 902.
68
See 502 N.E.2d at 1377 (Hennessey, C.J., plurality opinion) (noting the serious constitutional
questions raised by the setting in which certified questions were asked, and noting that the judges would
nonetheless answered the certified questions “in accordance with their clear and unequivocal wording”); id.
at 1380 (Wilkins, J., concurring) (“[S]ubstantial constitutional questions may be explicitly, and surely are
impliedly, involved in the questions”); id. at 1382 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The Chief Justice’s opinion
recognizes . . . that its answers to the certified questions may implicate serious constitutional
questions . . . .”).
69
See 855 F.2d at 903 (“Although all of the Justices’ reflections on this issue technically may fall under
the heading of dicta, they are so deliberate, so unanimously expressed, and involve such a basic
proposition, that we feel constrained to listen carefully.”).
70
702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997).
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District of Columbia Circuit asked the Maryland high court to resolve whether
recognition of the foreign judgment would “be repugnant to the public policy of
Maryland,” and therefore unenforceable under Maryland’s version of the Uniform
Foreign-Money Judgments Recognition Act.71 The Maryland Court of Appeals answered
the certified question in the affirmative, noting that it was not resolving issues of either
federal or state constitutional law, but rather interpreting the applicable judgment
recognition statute.72 But, the court added, “[w]hile we shall rest our decision in this case
upon the non-constitutional ground of Maryland public policy, nonetheless, in
ascertaining that public policy, it is appropriate to examine and rely upon the history,
policies, and requirements of the First Amendment [to the federal Constitution] and [its
Maryland constitutional analog].”73 And, indeed, the court’s subsequent analysis includes
numerous references to, and analysis of, general First Amendment law.74
A second possibility is for the state court to conclude that issues of federal law are
beyond the proper scope of the federal court’s certification, as did the Supreme Court of
Louisiana in Aguillard v. Green.75 There, the federal courts were asked to rule upon the
constitutionality of a state statute that required the teaching of creation science along with
evolution, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit called upon the
Supreme Court of Louisiana to decide, as a preliminary matter, “whether the 1974
Louisiana Constitution by vesting the responsibility exclusively in [the state Board of
Elementary and Secondary Education] prohibits the Legislature from prescribing courses
of study in elementary and secondary public schools.”76 Without so much as alluding to
the federal constitutional issue ultimately driving the case, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana answered the question in the affirmative and upheld the statute on state
constitutional grounds. Dissenting, Chief Justice Dixon asserted that the two issues were
inextricably linked,77 while Justice Watson, also dissenting, explicitly cited cases from

71

Id. at 236.
Id. at 239.
73
Id.
74
See, e.g., id. at 244-47.
75
440 So. 2d 704 (La. 1983).
76
Id. at 706.
77
See id. at 711 (Dixon, C.J., dissenting) (“Perhaps because the litigants have not forcefully presented
the issue, and have submitted to a division of the question, this court avoids the hard issue at the root of that
72
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other jurisdictions that had stricken similar statutes as unconstitutional under the federal
Constitution.78
A third possibility is for the state court to conclude that the certification
improperly calls upon it to address matters of federal law. For example, in In re Certified
Question from the United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan,79 the
Supreme Court of Michigan was asked by a federal district court to interpret a state
indecent exposure statute; as the certification request made clear, the federal court would
determine the constitutionality of the statute under the First Amendment based upon the
state court’s response. The state court declined to answer the certified question. Reasoned
the court:
[I]t is plain that the certified question procedure has not been
employed to obtain an expression of this Court’s opinion on a matter of
Michigan law at all, or, even simply to obtain this Court’s opinion [as to
how the statute should be interpreted]. It has been employed instead to
obtain a ruling from this Court on a question of First Amendment federal
constitutional law with very explicit instructions from the federal court to
this Court how that answer should be written to avoid federal court
adjudication that the statute is unconstitutional.80
To the extent that certification is simply a streamlined form of abstention,81 then
perhaps the first option described above is best—that is, for the state court to consider the
proper interpretation of the statute in light of any relevant federal constitutional
provisions: The Court has explained that Pullman abstention procedure “does not mean
one certified to us. It assumes that ‘creation-science’ is a ‘course of study.’”); id. (“From all that I have read
in the past, ‘creation-science’ is a religious doctrine, not a course of study.”).
78
See id. at 713 (Watson, J., dissenting).
79
359 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. 1984).
80
Id. at 516. The court further explained:
The rhetorical questions, of course, are by what authority does this Court tell the federal court
how the litigation before it challenging the constitutionality of our statute, should be decided and
by what authority does this Court “save” the statute from the probability of federal court
nullification by ruling on its constitutionality? There is no litigation before this Court challenging
the constitutionality of the statute. Indeed, there is no lawsuit on the matter before this Court at
all. There is a mere request for an advisory opinion not about “Michigan law” as is required by
[the Michigan certification statute], but about the constitutionality of a Michigan statute under the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution, a question of federal constitutional law,
thinly veiled behind a purported request to advise the federal court [how the statute should be
interpreted], accompanied by advice as to precisely how the question should be answered.
Id.
81
See supra text accompanying note 18.
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that a party must litigate his federal claims in the state courts, but only that he must
inform those courts what his federal claims are, so that the state statute may be construed
‘in light of’ those claims.”82 But, if that is so, how should the federal court “reassemble”
a case after a state court has answered certified questions? In the Redgrave case, the First
Circuit decided to consider the views of the Justices of the Massachusetts high court
beyond simply the answers to the certified questions.83 While this may be the correct
path, it is interesting to note, from the perspective of difficulties that result from case
decomposition, that the First Circuit had to resolve the case en banc, and that two of the
five sitting judges vociferously dissented, arguing that the First Circuit should be bound
by the simple votes of the Massachusetts high court judges as to whether to answer the
certified questions “yes” or “no”.84
Abstention.—Abstention presents a complicated procedure for case decomposition. When
a federal court abstains under Pullman, the state court has full authority to resolve state
and federal issues unless a litigant clearly reserves the federal issues for federal court85
and properly preserves those issues by not litigating them in the state forum.86 If a litigant
properly makes an England reservation, then the state court lacks the power to resolve
federal issues. Indeed, if the state court nonetheless proceeds to resolve federal law issues
over the litigant’s objection, that resolution is not binding upon return to the federal court.
In short, then, the state court initially decomposes the case; if the federal court disagrees
with that decomposition, however, and concludes that the state court overstepped its
bounds, then the federal court’s “re-decomposition” controls.

82

England, 375 U.S. at 420; see Randall P. Bezanson, Abstention: The Supreme Court and Allocation of
Judicial Power, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1116 (1974) (noting that, under Pullman abstention, “the state
court is not prohibited from considering the state law issue in light of the federal issue”).
83
See 855 F.2d at 903 (“Although all of the Justices’ reflections on this issue technically may fall under
the heading of dicta, they are so deliberate, so unanimously expressed, and involve such a basic
proposition, that we feel constrained to listen carefully.”). The First Circuit proceeded to reason that, even
though the Massachusetts high court had fractured into three camps, none of which constituted a majority,
one could extrapolate that all the Justices would agree on ultimate outcome. See id. at 909-10. The First
Circuit also indicated that, even if that extrapolation were not accurate, the concurrence combined with the
dissent to form a majority on outcome. See id. at 909.
84
See id. at 912 (Bownes, J., dissenting).
85
See supra text accompanying note 14.
86
See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 340-41 (2005) (England
reservation ineffective where parties advanced federal constitutional arguments before state court).
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Abstention presents the same legal decomposition challenges as does
certification,87 but, unlike certification, also raises two other concerns: factfinding and
preclusion. Consider first the problem of decomposing factual issues. While certification
generally envisions state courts responding to certified questions only in the light of a
fully developed factual record, the procedure in no way calls upon or allows the state
court to render factual findings. Abstention, in contrast, calls upon the state court not only
to resolve the state law issues but also the factual questions underlying those issues. And,
just as the state court is precluded (assuming a valid England reservation) from resolving
issues of federal law, so too is it precluded from resolving the factual questions
underlying those issues.88 As I noted above, at the end of the day, the federal court may
disagree with the state court’s efforts to disaggregate the relevant legal and factual issues,
87

On one reading, England reservation simply allows for litigants to reserve for review in federal courts
federal claims—that is, claims arising under federal law—while allowing for state court resolution of state
law claims. See, e.g., England, 375 U.S. at 415 (“There are fundamental objections to any conclusion that a
litigant who has properly invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider federal
constitutional claims can be compelled, without his consent and through no fault of his own, to accept
instead a state court’s determination of those claims.” (emphasis added)); id. at 417 (noting a litigant’s
“right to litigate his federal claims fully in the federal courts” (emphasis added). On this understanding
then, cases are “naturally” decomposed, based simply on whether each claim arises under state or federal
law. On the other hand, language elsewhere in England suggests that the federal reservation applies to
federal law questions, not claims. See, e.g., id. at 415-16 (recognizing “the primacy of the federal judiciary
in deciding questions of federal law”). Professor Field is similarly ambiguous, compare Field, supra note
58, at 1079 (England “held that a litigant remanded to state court under that doctrine cannot be compelled
to submit his federal claims for state court disposition. . . .” (emphasis added)) with id. (“[A]bstention may
not be used to deprive [a litigant invoking a reservation] of the benefits of an initial federal determination
of the federal issues. . . .” (emphasis added)), as is Professor Friedman, compare, e.g., Friedman, supra
note 28, at 1271 (“Federal jurisdiction should be available for federal claims.” (emphasis added)) with id. at
1269 (“So long as the state party indicates that it intends to obtain litigation of federal questions in federal
court, that reservation should be enough.” (emphasis added)). I believe the England is better understood to
apply to federal issues, not claims. Indeed, England itself involved a case where, when three would-be
chiropractors sued for a declaration that a Louisiana statute that forbade them from practicing in Louisiana
was violative of the federal Constitution, the federal court abstained pending state court determination of
whether the statute applied to the plaintiffs (the resolution of which question might obviate the need to
resolve the federal constitutional issue). England recognized the right of litigants to reserve for federal
court review not entire claims, but rather questions of federal law that might be subsets of claims.
88
E.g., Field, supra note 58, at 1079. Compare, in this regard, the use of Pullman abstention with the
use of Burford abstention, where the decision to abstain in favor of state court litigation (including state
court factfinding) is based in part on the state court’s “superior factfinding abilities.” Bezanson, supra note
82, at 1123-24. Note as well that, when the Supreme Court reviews a state court’s resolution of federal law
on certiorari, it generally accepts the state court system’s factfinding, even though that factfinding may
influence the ultimate resolution of the federal issue. See Field, supra note 58, at 1084.
It may be that some (or all) of the factual questions that underlie the state law issues that the state court
properly resolves also underlie the federal law issues. In such cases, the question arises whether issue
preclusion may bind the federal court to the state court’s factual conclusions. For an argument that it does,
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in which case the federal court’s views will control—that is to say, the federal court will
not be bound under England by the state court’s findings. At the same time, however, as I
shall discuss presently, preclusion doctrine may vest additional power in state court
factfinding.
Turning to preclusion, the Supreme Court held in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City &
County of San Francisco that the full faith and credit statute89 requires federal courts to
give preclusive effect to state court holdings, even where the plaintiff is forced to raise
claims in state court in order to have her federal claims ripen, and even where the
plaintiff proceeds in state court while the federal court abstains under Pullman90 and
where the plaintiff makes an England reservation.91 As a result, issue preclusion
generally binds an abstaining federal court to a state court’s findings, that are necessary
to the state court’s holding, on issues of evidentiary fact, and issues of “ultimate fact”—
that is, put broadly, law applied to fact.92

see Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251, 272-76
(2006).
89
See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
90
See 545 U.S. at 341-47. Under the Court’s holding in Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, federal takings claims do not ripen until a state fails “to
provide adequate compensation for the taking.” 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985). After the district court relied on
Williamson County to hold the plaintiffs’ taking claim untimely, the plaintiffs in San Remo asked the Ninth
Circuit to abstain under Pullman while the plaintiffs pursued an inverse condemnation action in the
California state courts and thus ripened their federal claim. 545 U.S. at 330-31. After losing on the merits in
state court, the district court and subsequently the Ninth Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal takings
claim, this time relying upon the issue preclusive effect of the state court’s ruling. Id. at 332-35. The
Supreme Court affirmed.
91
While noting that the plaintiffs had raised arguments inconsistent with their invocation of England,
the Court observed that its holding on the lack of an exception to the full faith and credit statute did not turn
on England. See id. at 341-42.
92
See Sterk, supra note 88, at 273-74 &.121.
Though issue preclusion also applies generally to pure matters of law, see id., that will presumably not
be of moment in the abstention setting where an England reservation is properly invoked: Any pure legal
questions resolved should be matters of state law, which by definition the federal court will not be
confronting. See id. at 273-74 (explaining why “according issue-preclusive effect to a state court
determination of law . . . will not generally prevent a landowner from mounting a federal takings challenge
in federal court”). If, on the other hand, the state court improperly addresses a matter of federal law, the San
Remo Court did hold that the England reservation (assuming it is properly preserved) will deny preclusive
effect to the state court’s determination. See id. at 280.
Though it is less likely, claim preclusion could also present a problem. Under claim preclusion, a federal
court may be barred from hearing a claim—even a federal claim—if the plaintiff has first proceeded in state
court and could have brought in that forum the federal claim along with a closely related state claim, but
chose not to do so. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83-84 (1984). Absent an
exception for England reservations, it would seem that exercises of Pullman abstention might often give
rise to assertions of claim preclusion—for example, in cases where claims are raised under analogous
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Supreme Court Certiorari Review of State Court Cases.—Difficulties in decomposition
also may arise under Supreme Court certiorari review of state court decisions. One might
think that manifestation of those difficulties would be rare, insofar as the Supreme Court
both decides upon the proper decomposition of the case and then has the freedom not just
to resolve the federal issues but to decide the case itself. Consider, however, two areas of
possible problem.
First, how should the Supreme Court decide whether independent issues of federal
law abound in a state court decision? In theory, “where the judgment of a state court rests
upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other non-federal in character,
[Supreme Court] jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is independent of the federal
ground and adequate to support the judgment.”93 However, since its 1983 decision in
Michigan v. Long,94 the Court has applied a presumption that there is no independent and
adequate state law ground “when it is not clear from the opinion itself that the state court
relied upon an adequate and independent state ground and when it fairly appears that the
state court rested its decision primarily on federal law.”95
This had the effect of expanding the Court’s jurisdiction to review state court
cases, but also of increasing the likelihood that state courts on remand would adhere to
their earlier decision on the ground that it was, contrary to the Court’s presumption, based
federal and state constitutional provisions. E.g., San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 145
F.3d 1095, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1998) (abstaining from plaintiffs’ facial federal takings claim pending state
court litigation).
Does England reservation provide an exception to application of claim preclusion? As Professor Sterk
notes, while “[t]he Supreme Court’s opinion in San Remo did not expressly determine whether the hotel’s
effort to litigate its federal takings claim in federal court was foreclosed by the doctrine of claim preclusion
or by the doctrine of issue preclusion,” Sterk, supra 88, at 272, “[n]othing in the Court’s analytical
framework distinguishes issue preclusion from claim preclusion,” and “Section 1738 applies equally to
claim preclusion and issue preclusion,” id. at 280. Nonetheless, Professor Sterk concedes that, for an
England reservation to be effective, it must trump: “When a federal court properly invokes the abstention
doctrine, a state court judgment rendered after an England reservation will have neither issue preclusive
effect nor claim preclusive effect in a subsequent federal adjudication of federal claims.” Id. at 280.
At the same time, Professor Sterk argues that, when “no ground for abstention exists, England
reservations are not authorized and can operate to trump neither state issue preclusion doctrine nor state
claim preclusion doctrine.” Id. This point, if true, has ramifications for Professor Friedman’s proposal to
allow for anticipatory England reservations, see supra text accompanying note 14, as I discuss below, see
infra notes 185-192 and accompanying text.
93
Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935).
94
463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
95
Id. at 1042.
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on an independent and adequate state law ground.96 In this sense, the Michigan v. Long
presumption is a decomposition device, but one that state courts may, and often do, rebut.
Consider, moreover, the lengths to which state courts may go to preserve their
decisions as grounded on an independent state law basis. In Racing Association of
Central Iowa v. Fitzgerald,97 the Iowa Supreme Court held that a state tax on gambling
receipts from racetracks at nearly twice the rate imposed on receipts from riverboat
gambling violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States and an analogous
provision of the Iowa Constitutions. The court noted that the “same analysis” applied to
determining the applicability of both provisions.98 The United States Supreme Court, by
writ of certiorari, reversed the state court’s federal constitutional holding and remanded
the case for further proceedings.99 On remand, the Iowa Supreme Court adhered to its
original decision on state law grounds.100 The state court expressly declined to hold that
the Iowa Constitution required a different analytical framework from federal law to
evaluate equal protection claims,101 holding instead that the rational basis test, which was
the governing standard under federal law, applied as well under Iowa law but demanded a
different outcome.102
The upshot in defying Supreme Court authority to decompose cases is simply to
decline to fulfill the Court’s mandate on remand. Though rare, this did happen in the case
of Johnson v. Radio Station WOW, Inc.103 There, the Court reversed the Supreme Court
of Nebraska’s mandate in a state law fraud case that the parties do “all things necessary”
to achieve return of a radio station license,104 reasoning that license ownership lay within
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See Richard W. Westling, Note, Advisory Opinions and the “Constitutionally Required” Adequate
and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 63 TUL. L. REV. 379, 389 n.47 (1988) (calculating that 26.7% of
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the sole purview of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”).105 In formulating
the appropriate relief, the Court recognized the state court’s power to adjudicate fraud,
but also was concerned that a state court order that resulted in the separation of the FCC
radio license from the underlying physical property might “result . . . in the termination of
a broadcasting station,” which in turn might “deprive[] the public of those advantages
which presumably led the Commission to grant a license” in the first place.106 The Court
sought to vindicate these competing interests in fashioning relief: “We think that State
power is amply respected if it is qualified merely to the extent of requiring it to withhold
execution of that portion of its decree requiring retransfer of the physical properties until
steps are ordered to be taken, with all deliberate speed, to enable the Commission to deal
with new applications in connection with the station.”107 The Court remanded the case
“for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”108
On remand, the Supreme Court of Nebraska opined that the United States
Supreme Court had overstepped its bounds by deciding a matter of state law.109 The
105

326 U.S. at 130.
Johnson involved the lease of radio station and the transfer of the station’s license by the fraternal
society that owned the station to a corporate entity. A member of the society sued the fraternal society and
the corporation in Nebraska state court on his own behalf and on behalf of all members of the society,
raising allegations of fraud, and asking the court to set aside the transfer of the lease and the assignment of
the license. 13 N.W.2d at 557. While the suit was pending, the FCC exercised its supervisory authority over
the station license and approved of the assignment. 326 U.S. at 121.
While the trial court found no fraud and dismissed the suit, the state supreme court reversed and
“ordered that the lease to the station, the lease to the space occupied by the station and the transfer of the
license to operate the station be vacated and set aside.” 13 N.W.2d at 564. On motion for rehearing, the
defendants argued that the state court improperly exercised jurisdiction properly belonging to the FCC. The
supreme court denied that motion as untimely, but did clarify its opinion as follows: “The effect of our
former opinion was to vacate the lease of the radio station and to order a return of the property to its former
status, the question of the federal license being a question solely for the Federal Communications
Commission. Our former opinion should be so construed.” 14 N.W.2d at 669.
The United States Supreme Court granted defendants’ petition for certiorari “[b]ecause of the
importance of the contention that the State court’s decision had invaded the domain of the Federal
Communications Commission.” 326 U.S. at 123. The Court declined to address the defendants’ primary
argument—that the state court exercised jurisdiction that was vested solely in the FCC—on the ground that
the state court’s ruling that the argument was raised belatedly constituted an independent and adequate state
law ground. 326 U.S. at 123. However, reasoning that ownership of the license lay within the sole purview
of the FCC, the Supreme Court explained that the state supreme court “went outside its bounds when it
ordered the parties ‘to do all things necessary’ to secure a return of the license.” Id. at 130 (quoting
Johnson, 13 N.W.2d at 564).
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will no longer be open insofar as it bears upon the reliability as licensee of any of the parties.” Id.
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Nebraska court recognized the Supreme Court’s authority to decide whether the Nebraska
court had encroached upon the FCC’s authority, but it identified that as the “only possible
basis for the attaching of federal jurisdiction.”110 It understood the Supreme Court’s
decision to go farther “The mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States directing
this court to withhold its mandate of the state court encroaches upon the plenary powers
of this court and tends to undermine the autonomy and destroy the independence of the
state courts in a field in which they are admittedly supreme.”111 The Nebraska court
proceeded to characterize the “contention” advanced by the Supreme Court—“that state
power is amply respected, even if it is qualified to the extent of requiring the withholding
of execution” of a portion of the Court’s decree—as “specious.”112 The court concluded:
“The mandate of this court will . . . issue on order by this court without reference to the
advisory directions contained in the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United
States.”113
Last, consider that state courts may so wish to preserve their holding that they
may seek to evade the reviewing power of the Supreme Court. On this basis, the Supreme
Court has developed the doctrine that it may review state court decisions purportedly
grounded in state law where the issue of state law is antecedent to a question of federal
law,114 or where the Supreme Court suspects the state court of having devised its
determination of state law so as to evade or cheat federal law or federal judicial review.115
***
A final point of difficulty raised by case decomposition relates to the difficulties
courts tend to have in resolving less than entire cases. The natural tendency of courts is to
110

Id. at 854.
Id. The Nebraska court evidently believed that its opinion on rehearing adequately preserved the
FCC’s authority over the license.
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Id. at 854-55.
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Id. at 855.
After the Supreme Court of Nebraska adhered to its earlier decision, the parties agreed to a new lease.
The case was not pursued again to the United States Supreme Court. Note, Evasion of Supreme Court
Mandates in Cases Remanded to State Courts Since 1941, supra note 13, at 1253 n.15.
One presumes that, had the case again been reviewed by the Supreme Court, the Court would have been
free to enforce its original mandate. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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decide cases based upon final outcomes, not constituent issues.116 At some level,
decomposition conflicts with this natural tendency.117 And the examples I have identified
bear this out. The courts in Johnson focused on outcome at every level.118 The Iowa
Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court wrestled over the outcome of the case
in Fitzgerald.119 By relying upon the state law issue, the Iowa Supreme Court was able to
reaffirm its earlier outcome and reject the United States Supreme Court’s outcome. And
Redgrave elucidates the tendency toward deciding outcomes in the context of
certification.120
B. Problems of Bias
The ordinary story is that the Constitution authorizes, and Congress has conferred,
federal court diversity jurisdiction on the grounds (or at least substantially on the
grounds) that state courts are biased against out-of-state residents—or are perceived to be
so, even if in fact they are not.121 In this sense, as expressed through Congress’ decision
115

See generally Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of State-Court
State-Law Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2002).
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See STEARNS, supra note 61, at 111-24 (arguing that judges’ general preference for outcome-based
voting is the result of natural evolution in decisionmaking).
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See England, 375 U.S. at 421 n.12 (“It has been suggested that state courts may ‘take no more
pleasure than do federal courts in deciding cases piecemeal * * *’ and ‘probably prefer to determine their
questions of law with complete records of cases in which they can enter final judgments before them.’”
(quoting Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 227 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting)).
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First, the Nebraska state court announced a preliminary outcome in the case. After the Supreme
Court identified a federal issue on which it had authority to rule, the Court proceeded to modify the
outcome in the case to incorporate its ruling on the federal law issue. On remand, the Nebraska Supreme
Court rejected the Supreme Court’s issue distinction and reinstated the outcome it previously had
announced. While issue decomposition provided a substantial ground for dispute between the courts, it was
ultimately through the outcome in the case that the Supreme Court sought to assert its authority, and it was
the outcome of the case that the Nebraska Supreme Court sought to protect. See supra notes 103-113 and
accompanying text.
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See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
121
Though the justifications for the constitutional and congressional grants of diversity jurisdiction are
myriad and subject to debate, still it remains the case that avoiding bias and the appearance of bias are, at
the least, two of the principal justifications. See Nash, supra note 16, at 1729 n.223, and the authorities
cited therein. See also id. at 1730 n.224 (arguing that the affirmative choice to retain diversity jurisdiction
in the face of arguments to repeal it reflects at least some belief that the risk of bias and perceived bias
remains somewhat vibrant). While some argue that the diversity jurisdiction proved to be invaluable for the
economic and commercial development of the country, see, e.g., Adrienne J. Marsh, Diversity Jurisdiction:
Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal Courts, 48 BROOKLYN L. REV. 197, 206-10 (1982); William Howard
Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in Administration of Justice in Federal Courts, 8 A.B.A. J. 601, 604
(1922), that point ultimately may rest on the perception of bias, see Taft, supra, at 604 (“The material
question is not so much whether the justice administered [in state courts with respect to litigants from other
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to instantiate the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction, federal courts are in certain
circumstances seen to be better fora for state court claims than are state courts.122
To the extent that state courts are biased against out-of-state residents, state and
federal courts do not, and should not decide state law claims identically: While Erie
directs that federal courts decide state law questions as would the relevant state high
court, that directive implicitly includes an exception for bias against litigants that state
courts themselves might exhibit. The implicit justification is that state courts may
manipulate state law—that is, apply state law to achieve a different outcome—when at
least one of the parties hails from out-of-state.
On the other hand, to the extent that state courts are in reality (either broadly or in
particular cases) not biased against out-of-state residents but run the risk of being
perceived to be so, the fact that federal and state courts will decide state law issues in the
same way (as Erie otherwise directs) will serve to dispel the incorrect perceptions of bias,
and to bolster and indeed to legitimate state court decisions on matters of state law in
other cases.
To the extent that they allow for resolution in state court, in whole or in part, of
state law claims that are otherwise to be heard in federal court—especially those in
federal court by virtue of the diversity jurisdiction—transjurisdictional procedural
devices frustrate the attainment of these goals. In other words, while one might dispute
either the suggestion that state courts are often biased, the suggestion that they are often
perceived to be biased, or both, the fact that the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction
regions of the country] is actually impartial and fair, as it is whether it is thought to be so by those who are
considering the wisdom of investing their capital in states where their capital is needed for the promotion of
enterprises and industrial and commercial progress.”).
122
Cf. Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1421-22 (arguing that perhaps federal courts are better suited to decide
state constitutional law issues, based in part upon the argument that a “federal court’s familiarity with
constitutional adjudication might compensate for its potential unfamiliarity with some aspects of state
law”); Marsh, supra note 121, at 212 (“[C]ontinued heavy use of diversity jurisdiction has been cited as
evidence of its continuing need to overcome the perceived shortcomings of the state courts.” (footnote
omitted)). The converse is generally not seen to be true; that is, there is no sustained argument that state
courts provide a better forum for federal law claims across a wide swath of cases. Indeed, commentators
generally argue that federal courts provide at least as good, if not a better, forum for the vindication of
federal civil rights claims. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
Still, there are some who argue that state courts in particular contexts and at particular times may offer a
friendlier forum. See William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMM. 599 (1999);
Bezanson, supra note 82, at 1123 (“In virtually every Burford abstention case the Supreme Court has . . .
emphasized the reliability of the state court adjudicatory process in the resolution of the issues presented.”).
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remains “on the books” suggests that decisions to send state law claims that otherwise
would be wholly resolved in federal court back, in whole or in part, to state court should
not be taken lightly. Thus, the Supreme Court has stated that “the difficulties of
ascertaining what the state courts may hereafter determine the state law to be do not in
themselves afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to decline to exercise its
jurisdiction to decide a case which is properly brought to it for decision.”123 Rather, “[i]n
the absence of some recognized public policy or defined principle guiding the exercise of
the jurisdiction conferred, which would in exceptional cases warrant its non-exercise, it
has from the first been deemed to be the duty of the federal courts, if their jurisdiction is
properly invoked, to decide questions of state law whenever necessary to the rendition of
a judgment.”124 And, indeed, other than recognizing the propriety of certification and
very limited applications of abstention doctrine,125 the Supreme Court has generally
adhered to this view. The introduction of certain new transjurisdictional procedural
devices, and expansion and increased use of existing ones, are inconsistent with this
view.
One might argue that certification—unlike procedural devices such as abstention
that allow for state court systems to address cases in their entirety—adequately protects
against state court bias in three ways. First, certification involves only judges of the
state’s highest court, and those judges are less likely to exhibit bias (or to be perceived to
exhibit bias) than are lower state court judges. Second, any use of a jury takes place in
federal court with a jury drawn from a federal jury pool. This, too, reduces the likelihood
of bias, of the perception of bias. And, third, all factfinding takes place in the federal
court; state courts on certification decide only abstract questions of state law, leaving the
opportunities for bias quite small.
None of these arguments (whether alone, or taken together) establishes that bias,
or the perception of bias, will be eliminated under certification procedure. First, it is
simply not the case that a state’s high court judges are less likely to be biased, or to be
perceived to be biased. To the contrary, the fact that high court judges are not bound by
123

Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. at 234.
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See supra note 28 and the accompanying text.
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precedent affords them greater leeway to engage in bias.126 And the fact that many
members of state courts of last resort are elected raises the specter of bias or at least of its
appearance.127
Second, while jury determinations will be made in federal court, the possibility of
bias extends beyond juries to state tribunals.128 Indeed, the fact that federal juries, like
state juries, are drawn from the residents of the state in which the federal court is located
(albeit from a wider swath of the state) has led defenders of federal diversity jurisdiction
to argue that the source of bias is not so much the jury itself but rather the power the trial
judge exercises in controlling and instructing the jury.129
Third, the notion that state high courts answer certified questions in a vacuum is
incorrect. Indeed, the cognate point—that all factfinding takes place in federal court—
itself undermines the notion that the state court responds to abstract legal questions.
Rather, the fact that state high courts as a rule decline certification requests absent a
sufficiently developed factual record shows that state courts answer—and, indeed, will
only answer—certified questions in context. This leaves the state court the freedom to
distinguish the certified answers in subsequent opinions. At the same time, however, the
setting of certification gives the state high court the cover to claim that it is simply
answering abstract legal questions, making the potential for bias (or the appearance of
bias) especially invidious.130 As Professors Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins
explain, “the risk of bias against a nonresident in the interpretation of untested state law
may be even greater than in cases of routine law application to disputed facts.”131
126

See Nash, supra note 16, at 1743. Indeed, the large sums of money expended, and attention focused,
on races for seats on state high courts is evidence of the great discretion that state high court judges enjoy.
See id.
127
See id. at 1742-43.
While serving as a West Virginia Supreme Court Justice, Richard Neely wrote:
As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to injured in-state
plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced when I give someone else’s
money away, but so is my job security, because the in-state plaintiffs, their families, and their
friends will reelect me.
RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS 4 (1988).
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Congress presumably could decide, but has not decided, to extend diversity jurisdiction solely to
cases that involve jury trials.
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See Nash, supra note 16, at 1741, and the authorities cited therein.
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See id. at 1743-45.
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Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Judicial Federalism and the Administrative States, 87 CAL.
L. REV. 613, 677 (1999).
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This risk, moreover, is not merely theoretical; it has in fact come to pass. As I
detail elsewhere, in a pair of cases, the Supreme Court of Texas initially answered
certified questions in what appeared to be a broad statement of law, only two years later
to issue an opinion that relegated the certified answers to the facts there presented.132
Without ascribing intentional bias to the judges of the Texas court (and recalling that the
mere appearance of bias is problematic), the fact remains that the net result of the two
opinions was to treat an in-state litigant more favorably than a similarly-situated out-ofstate litigant.
Professor Friedman has suggested that the real question is whether the state
court’s holdings are general statements of law, broadly applicable without regard to
citizenship.133 I do not disagree with this general point. Indeed, I suggest below that such
a metric might be used to determine whether the federal court should be bound by a state
court’s response to a certified question.
C. Disparity in Judicial System Power
The successful use of transjurisdictional procedural devices rests upon one of two
bases (or a combination thereof): comity between the two judicial systems implicated by
the use of the device, and/or the power of one of the two judicial systems to employ the
device. Insofar as they tend to understand transjurisdictional devices to further comity
among judicial systems, commentators tend to assume (if implicitly) that the
132

See Nash, supra note 16, at 1745-47 (discussing Lucas v. Untied States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.
1988), and Rose v. Doctors Hospital, 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990)).
133
Professor Friedman argues that, “[e]ven in the case [that I] discuss[], the subsequent ruling was itself
general, and the body of law now contains the general principles from those two cases, principles that will
apply without regard to the citizenship of parties.” Friedman, supra note 28, at 1239 n.72. The problem,
however, is that the first opinion—that is, the response to the certified questions—what to all appearances
purported to be a general statement of law turned out not to be. one well might have said—erroneously, as
it turned out—that the first decision by the Texas court was “general” such that the “body of law . . .
contains the general principles” from that case. This begs the question: What exactly constitutes “general
principles” in this context? More importantly, the ultimate question is whether state courts treat responses
to certified questions differently from their other opinions.
Professor Friedman also questions the importance of the example I offer, arguing that I “give[] no idea
how pervasive the phenomenon is, and there is room to be skeptical.” Id. It is true that I make no assertion,
and offer no evidence, as to how pervasive the phenomenon is, but neither does Professor Friedman offer
evidence of how constrained it is. Ultimately, while the question indeed is an empirical one, in my view it
is not clear on whose shoulders the burden of proof should fall. The point in any event remains that the
Texas cases demonstrate that the phenomenon is not purely theoretical. However frequently it may occur
now, moreover, increased use of certification would make its occurrence more likely. See infra page 41.

Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudication

31

transjurisdictional devices they endorse rest upon and further comity. And, indeed,
comity is the stronger base on which to design a transjurisdictional device. The problem,
however, is that the existing commentary fails adequately to analyze the degree to which
existing or proposed devices in fact rest upon comity, as opposed to disparities in power.
As a general matter, the federal court system enjoys a considerable power
advantage over the various state judicial systems. First, federal law is expressly binding
upon all state courts by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.134 Second, the federal courts are
part of the federal government and, as such, sit atop their state court counterparts much as
the federal government sits atop state governments. Third, all state courts are directly
inferior to a part of the federal court system: the United States Supreme Court. By
contrast, the federal courts only need to apply state law by virtue of the Court’s decision
in Erie,135 and then only when Congress has seen fit to extend jurisdiction over questions
of state law. And, further, one can see congressional action to authorize (or require)
federal courts to hear state law claims as a further example of federal court power over
state courts, insofar as state courts have no say in the matter and in effect are required to
share jurisdiction with the federal courts, and indeed effectively to lose the right to
adjudicate cases that otherwise would fall under their purview.136 Fourth, federal courts
may stay actions in state court under appropriate circumstances,137 but state courts may
not as a general matter stay actions in federal court.138 Fifth, federal courts trying to
134

See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
See supra note 27; see also Clark, supra note 17, at 1477 & n.92 (questioning whether the result in
Erie is constitutionally required); W. David Sarratt, Note, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90 VA.
L. REV. 1487, 1513 n.105 (2004), and the authorities cited therein (same).
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Courts of a state also share jurisdiction in this sense with courts of another system, and also generally
do not have a final say in the interpretation of state law, when matters arising under the law of that state are
litigated in the courts of another state. In both cases, the state courts are not divested of jurisdiction, but
also do not enjoy exclusive jurisdiction.
137
The Anti-Injunction Act states that a federal court “may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect and effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006). While it thus limits the
circumstances under which federal courts may issue injunctions against state courts, see, e.g., Atlantic
Coastline R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970) (describing the Act as
“an absolute prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of
three specifically defined exceptions”), still the Act confirms at the same time the power of federal courts
to issue such injunctions.
138
See, e.g., Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1964) (“While Congress has seen fit to
authorize courts of the United States to restrain state-court proceedings in some special circumstances, it
has in no way relaxed the old and well-established judicially declared rule that state courts are completely
without power to restrain federal-court proceedings in in personam actions like the one here.” (footnotes
135
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discern state law undertake an endeavor quite distinct from that undertaking by state
courts asked to rule upon issues of federal law. Erie calls for federal courts to decide
matters of state law as would the relevant state high court. While the leeway that this
affords federal courts is open to debate,139 nonetheless it is clear that, at some level, the
federal court must endeavor to act as it believes the state court would. In effect, if the
Erie mandate is followed, the federal court can be said to act as the faithful agent of the
state court.140 By contrast, the role of a state court faced with questions of federal law is
different. While the state court should endeavor to decide the federal law issues
“correctly” and while in some sense this may involve anticipating how the United States
Supreme Court would decide the issues, it hardly seems accurate to describe the state
court as acting the Supreme Court’s faithful agent.141
Despite the evident power disparity, advocates of expanded transjurisdictional
procedural devices rely upon cooperation between court systems to effectuate their goals.
In other words, the commentators rely, if implicitly, upon Professor Edward Corwin’s
pronouncement that the era of dual federalism—in which the federal government and
state governments coexist but the relation between them “is one of tension rather than

omitted)). See id. at 412-14 (invalidating state court order enjoining parties from prosecuting parallel suit in
federal court, and vacating state court judgment of contempt for violation of order). But see Princess Lida
of Thurn and Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 465-68 (1939) (upholding a state court order enjoining
litigants from pursuing relief in federal court on the ground that the state court had the power to protect its
ability, to the exclusion of the federal court, to adjudicate the in rem case before it).
139
See Jonathan Remy Nash, Resuscitating Deference to Lower Federal Court Judges’ Interpretations
of State Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 975, 997-98 (2004) (identifying factors that federal courts sometimes
consider in Erie analyses).
140
Charging the federal court to act as the state court’s ‘faithful agent’ does not render it, in Judge
Frank’s words, the “ventriloquist’s dummy” to the state court. See Richardson v. Comm’r, 126 F.2d 562,
567 (2d Cir. 1942) (“[W]e are not here compelled by [Erie] to play the role of ventriloquist’s dummy to the
courts of some particular state; as we understand it, ‘federal law,’' not ‘local law,’ is applicable.”) (Frank,
J.); John P. Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7, 13 (1963) (noting that the
continuation of federal diversity jurisdiction is subject to the “ventriloquist’s dummy criticism,” and noting
that the criticism “may have merit”); Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV.
651, 655 (1995) (“[N]o judge ought to be anyone’s ‘ventriloquist’s dummy,’ and any doctrine that does not
recognize this merits serious reexamination.” (quoting Richardson, 126 F.2d at 567)).
141
In addition to the points in the text, consider the argument that Supreme Court has deliberately
carved out from the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and thus left to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state
courts, matters that traditionally fall within the realm of the feminine. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, “Naturally”
without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1699 (1991)
(noting “the deliberate construction of jurisdictional rules and doctrine to exclude "domestic relations" from
federal court authority”); id. at 1739-50.
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collaboration”142—(if ever there was such an era) has passed.143 One ought not to
presume, however, that the retreat of dual federalism leaves unabashed cooperative
federalism in its stead. To whatever extent there ever was an era of cooperative
federalism,144 it is “interactive federalism,” not cooperative federalism, that most aptly
describes the relationship today between the federal judiciary and state court systems.145
Just as the age of pure dual federalism may never have existed, so too is it an
overstatement to describe today’s atmosphere as one of pure cooperative federalism.146
Thus does interactive federalism “implicitly recognize the continued relevance of at least
some form of dualism.”147
Commentators have generally failed to acknowledge the mismatch between the
suggestion to rely more heavily on transjurisdictional procedural devices on the one hand,
and the reality of dual federalism on the other. In reality, all transjurisdictional procedural
devices operate based upon voluntary cooperation, power disparity, or some combination
thereof. The combinations vary, however. Certification relies more heavily on voluntary
cooperation, while abstention and certiorari review rely more heavily on power
disparity—and thus are more likely to create friction between the court systems.148
142

Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1950).
See id. at 4-23.
144
Compare Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1404 (“Some have declared the end of the era of cooperative
federalism. Others have merely called for its demise.” (footnotes omitted)); John Kincaid, Foreword: The
New Federalism Context of the New Judicial Federalism, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 913, 920 (1995) (referring to
“the New Deal era of cooperative federalism (circa 1933-1968)”), with Redish, supra note 6, at 864
(expressing skepticism as to whether cooperative federalism ever held sway).
145
See Redish, supra note 6, at 874-88; MARTIN REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE
29 (1995); Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1404; Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive
Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 250-51 (2005).
146
As the Supreme Court explained in Atlantic Coastline R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970):
While the lower federal courts were given certain powers in the 1789 Act, they were not given
any power to review directly cases from state courts, and they have not been given such powers
since that time. Only the Supreme Court was authorized to review on direct appeal the decisions
of state courts. Thus from the beginning we have had in this country two essentially separate legal
systems. Each system proceeds independently of the other with ultimate review in this Court of
the federal questions raised in either system. Understandably this dual court system was bound to
lead to conflicts and frictions.
147
Redish, supra note 6, at 882. Cf. Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1404 (“The new phase of federalism . . .
though, will place more emphasis than cooperative federalism on competition and even confrontation
among the states and between the states and the national government.”).
148
Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy
Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998) (arguing that cooperation
between governments is more effective than coercion).
143
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All three procedures vest substantial power in the federal courts. Only
certification, however, vests any real power in the state courts. Under certification, one of
the parties may request that the federal court initiate certification proceedings, or the
federal court may do so sua sponte;149 either way, the federal court has ultimate discretion
whether to use certification.150 However, it is also true that the state court then has
discretion as to whether to accept the request for certification.151 Further, with respect to
decomposition of the case into constituent issues, while the federal court initially states
the questions to be answered, the state court has the freedom to decline to answer some or
all of the questions, or to redraft the questions as it sees fit.152 It thus seems that
certification does a good job of relying upon, and encouraging, comity between the
federal court system and the state judiciaries.
As compared to certification, Supreme Court review of state court rulings by writ
of certiorari relies far more heavily upon disparity in power. Under previous procedural
regimes, the Supreme Court was obligated to review at least some state court
decisions.153 By contrast, under the current system of direct Supreme Court review of
state court decisions on matters of federal law, it is the system whose questions of law are
at issue that enjoys full discretion.154 It is the parties who petition for its use, and the
Supreme Court that decides whether to invoke it; the state court has no voice in the use of
the device. Thus, direct Supreme Court review empowers one system to correct another
system, while certification empowers one system to ask another system to help it resolve
questions of law (and the other system remains free to decline that request for help).
Power over case decomposition is also less well balanced under certiorari review
than under certification. While the federal court decides (perhaps with the input of the
parties) what issues it would like the state high court to determine under both devices,155
under direct Supreme Court review, it is the Court itself that ultimately decides the scope

149

See supra text accompanying note 19.
See Nash, supra note 16, at 1692.
151
See supra text accompanying note 21.
152
See supra text accompanying note 23.
153
See supra note 11.
154
See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
155
See supra text accompanying notes 9 and 20.
150
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of the review that it will undertake.156 The Court in theory must restrict its review to
matters of federal law, but that in practice may prove difficult. This may further
complicate relations with the state court whose decision is under Supreme Court review,
since, as in Johnson, the state court may resent what it perceives to be an impingement on
its authority to decide matters of state law. Further, the Court’s presumption under
Michigan v. Long157 can be seen to have two deleterious effects on federal-state court
relations. First, the presumption results in more state high court decisions being reviewed.
Second, the presumption makes it likely that at least some of the time the Court will
erroneously treat state court decisions as relying on federal law when in fact they rest
upon independent and adequate state law grounds.158 Indeed, the ambivalent relationship
between the state and federal judiciaries is evident in the examples I discussed above; the
Johnson and Fitzgerald cases highlight the potential for conflict between the Supreme
Court and state courts whose decisions are reviewed.159
Certification also compares favorably to abstention on this metric. Unlike
certification where the state court is free to decline involvement, a state court is expected
to act once a federal court has abstained. Moreover, under England reservation doctrine,
the federal court is free to disregard what the state court thought was the proper
decomposition of the case into state and federal issues once the case returns to federal
court.160
In the end, then, two devices—abstention and review by the Supreme Court of
state law judgments by writ of certiorari—seem more inclined to emphasize the friction
between the systems. By contrast, certification of questions of state law is better designed
to foster, and benefit from, cooperation between the systems.
156

See supra text accompanying note 9-10.
See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
158
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
159
See supra text accompanying notes 97-113.
Cf. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 381-82 (1816) (opinion of Johnson, J.)
(suggesting that perhaps the better practice, and one that better preserves the dignity and independence of
the state courts, is simply for the Supreme Court to enter judgment rather than to remand a case to the state
court with instructions that the state court must follow).
160
See Bezanson, supra note 82, at 1117, 1126 (noting that “friction between the state and federal
systems . . . may be exacerbated . . . under Pullman abstention); see also id. at 1134 (“If . . . avoidance of
friction between federal and state systems is the paramount justification for abstention, one might well
conclude that only Burford-type abstention would be wholly justified.”).
157
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REASSESSING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF TRANSJURISDICTIONAL
ADJUDICATION
In this Part, I describe, and apply, a fuller benefit-cost analysis for

transjurisdictional adjudication. First, I identify costs, based upon the obstacles I
identified in the previous Part, that commentators have either overlooked or
underestimated. Second, I discuss one benefit of transjurisdictional adjudication—
affording a court system the opportunity to resolve definitive matters arising under that
system’s native law—that commentators have tended to overvalue or overemphasize.
Third, I identify the opportunity costs of transjurisdictional adjudication—that is, the
benefits of intersystemic adjudication that are foregone by virtue of reliance on
transjurisdictional adjudication. Finally, I use the fuller consideration of benefits and
costs that results to suggest refinements to current certification procedure, and also to
design a new transjurisdictional procedural device.
A. Identifying Overlooked and Underestimated Costs and Benefits
The obstacles that I identified in the previous Part give rise to costs commentators
often have undervalued or overlooked. First, decomposing cases into constituent issues
generates costs. There are costs to the courts involved—possibly exacerbating, and
exacerbated by, power disparities between the relevant court systems—in terms of
deciding who determines the proper decomposition and what the proper decomposition
is. There also may be costs, both monetary and temporal, to litigants with respect to the
decomposition process. For example, in the Fitzgerald case, certiorari review and remand
added almost two years to the time necessary to resolve the case definitively,161 with no

161

The Iowa Supreme Court handed down its original decision on August 6, 2002. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on January 17, 2003, and handed down its opinion on June 9 of that year. The Iowa
Supreme Court issued its opinion on remand on February 3, 2004, and the Supreme Court denied a second
petition for certiorari on June 7, 2004. Certainty may be not only elusive, but also time-consuming.
Perhaps concerns of comity underlay the Supreme Court’s decision to hear the case a second time in the
wake of the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision on remand. The petitioner sought review based upon the
question:
Did the Iowa Supreme Court violate the United States Supreme Court mandate for “further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion” when on remand that Court declined to formulate
a different standard for examining claims under the state Equal Protection Clause, and accepted
federal equal protection principles, but reapplied the federal principles to reject as erroneous
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change in the final outcome. Finally, the presumption of Michigan v. Long may mean that
the Court may decide a case only to have the state court on remand disagree with the
presumption that the case originally was not decided on independent and adequate state
law grounds, and stand by its original decision. This will generate both legitimacy and
error costs.
Second, consider bias, and the perception of bias, and the costs it exacts on
invocations of transjurisdictional procedural devices. To the extent that use of an existing
or a new transjurisdictional procedural device sends state law issues that otherwise would
be decided in federal court back to state court, state courts regain their ability (or at least
their perceived ability) to discriminate against out-of-state litigants. If state courts in fact
engage in bias, this will generate error costs and legitimacy costs. Even if a state court
does not in fact decide cases in a biased way but is nonetheless perceived to do so, then
the use of such devices will still give rise to legitimacy costs even if they do not give rise
to error costs.
Consider now the extent to which costs will be imposed by devices that rely upon
disparity in judicial system power, rather than comity, to achieve effectiveness. First, the
absence of cooperation and emphasis on power disparity may make one court system—
likely the state court system—less likely to participate fully and voluntarily, which serves
only to undermine the success of the device itself. Second, to the extent that the
participation of one court system is less than willing, litigants may face increased costs
even if the use of the procedural device is ultimately “successful.” Third, tensions and
disagreements between court systems may bleed over to other interactions between court
systems. Thus, while the fact that courts from the different systems may deal with one
another repeatedly may on the one hand serve to rein in uncooperative actions,162 it is
also possible that the tensions that one transjurisdictional device generates may interfere
those specific rational bases expressly found by the United States Supreme Court to sustain a
state tax statute?
Brief of Petitioner i (filed Apr. 6, 2004) (available at 2004 WL 831355). The Court may have thought it
better not to raise the specter (by accepting review) that the Iowa court had shifted its position in order to
preserve its original holding. This may reflect some degree of comity; indeed, as I have discussed above, it
is not surprising to see federal court willingness to accommodate the state court (as opposed to the reverse)
given the structure of certiorari review, see supra text accompanying notes 152-159.
162
See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER, & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE
LAW 159-87 (1994) (discussing the relevance in game theory of repeated play).
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with the use of other transjurisdictional devices and with other interactions between
courts, and conceivably even between other branches of government. Fourth, there is a
possible cost in terms of the public conception of the judiciary: It is conceivable that the
public might lose confidence in judicial systems, both as a result of uncooperative
interactions that the public observes between judicial systems, and also as a result of
displeasure over one judicial system—likely the federal system—exerting power over
another court system in an unseemly way.
Even while it is true that transjurisdictional adjudication may create friction
between judicial systems (as well as error costs), it is also true that the absence of
transjurisdictional adjudication—that is, intersystemic adjudication—may itself foment
friction. Whether the frictions alleviated by transjurisdictional adjudication exceed those
introduced by it is an empirical question. My point is simply that it is a mistake to point
to transjurisdictional adjudication simply as a means of reducing friction, without
acknowledging that it may introduce frictions of its own.
B. An Overvalued and Overemphasized Benefit of Transjurisdictional Adjudication
Commentators often tend to extol the virtue of affording court systems the
opportunity to resolve questions arising under the system’s native law. While this is
clearly a benefit offered by the use of transjurisdictional adjudication, commentators have
sometimes tended to elevate this benefit to the exclusion of other benefits. In reality, our
federal system also reflects other values, as I now discuss. Other benefits often motivate
the generation and use of transjurisdictional procedural devices, sometimes even
substantially. That, in turn, draws in question the degree to which commentators have
emphasized the benefits of enabling a court system to resolve questions of native law.
To begin, it is important to note that it is possible to ameliorate, or even to
eliminate, some of these problems I discussed in Part IV—and the accompanying costs I
discussed in Part V.A—by having a unitary judicial system with a single final arbiter of
all legal questions.163 But there are benefits that come from having distinct judicial
163

Professor Robert Schapiro explains:
In Australia and Canada, . . . a federal high court serves as the ultimate interpreter of both
national and subnational law. Commentators credit the existence of a single final interpreter with
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systems. The maintenance of separate state and federal court systems satisfies both
social164 and political165 concerns.
The Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Statute and the full faith and credit
statute further evidence the Founders’ and Congress’s rejection of a unitary model. And
the Supreme Court’s agreement is evident from its decision in San Remo, which confirms
the limited availability of exceptions to the full faith and credit statute.166
That said, the existing system has generated transjurisdictional procedural devices
that often have the effect of enabling a court system to resolve questions that arise under
the system’s own set of laws. But the fact that a device may often have this effect does
not mean that it was designed primarily to achieve that result. Consider for example that,
while Pullman abstention does give state courts the opportunity to resolve contested
matters of state law,167 its genesis is a desire to allow federal courts to avoid unnecessary
decision of difficult constitutional questions168; indeed, Pullman abstention is not
permitted solely to allow state court resolution of matters of state law.169 In endorsing
Pullman abstention in cases where definitive state court resolution of a state law issue
may obviate the need for a federal court to address a novel or contest federal
creating a greater sense of the unity of the law. Statutory law differs among the states and
territories, but the federal high court serves as a unifying force. The absence of parallel court
systems decreases the possibility of interpretive divergence between state and federal tribunals,
and the single high court structure diminishes the variations in the law among the various states.
Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1409-10 (footnotes omitted).
164
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and
Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and the “Martian Chronicles”, 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1771-73 (1992)
(“One of the greatest values of our federal system is the benefit to be gained from an open interchange of
ideas among sovereigns. . . .”); cf. Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28
YALE J. INT’L L. 409 (2003) (discussing different models for, and the possible benefits of, transnational
judicial dialogue). See generally infra note 177 and accompanying text.
165
See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, A Brief History of the Adoption of the United States Constitution, 75
IOWA L. REV. 891, 901-02 (1990) (discussing the Madison-Wilson political compromise, under which the
Constitution authorized, but did not mandate, the creation of lower federal courts).
166
See Sterk, supra note 88, at 278 (describing language used by the Court in England that “focused on
a plaintiff’s right to litigate federal claims in a federal forum” as “quaint in light of the Court’s subsequent
jurisprudence”).
167
See Bezanson, supra note 82, at 1114.
168
See id. at 1112-13.
169
Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943) (federal court cannot abstain solely on the ground
that state law issue is novel or confusing). I have argued elsewhere that it is inconsistent with the federal
diversity jurisdictional grant to use certification in cases in so-called “pure diversity cases” in which no
issue of federal law lurks, i.e., in cases in which Pullman abstention remains unavailable under Meredith.
See Nash, supra note 16, at 1738. I have also argued that proposals to expand the use of certification, as
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constitutional issue but not in cases where no issue of federal law lurks, the Supreme
Court implicitly valued the benefit of avoiding “unnecessary” resolution of constitutional
issues over the benefit of having, at all costs, state courts resolve state law issues that
otherwise would be resolved in federal court.170
While commentators who evaluate transjurisdictional adjudication have tended to
focus on the benefit of empowering court systems to resolve native questions of law, the
reality is that neither the existing multiple judicial system model, nor the existence of
many transjurisdictional devices, vindicates valuing of this empowerment as an
unmitigated benefit. In this sense, then, many commentators have overstated or
overemphasized this benefit.171
Of course, the choice to have, nor not to have, a unitary court system is a
normative one, and one can make a normative argument in favor of a unitary system even
if one does not now exist. That said, it seems to me inconsistent to accept on the one hand
the existing multiple judicial system model, while on the other hand to extol devices that
would have the effect of moving the existing system closer to a unitary model, without
acknowledging other goals that might underlie the design and use of those devices.
C. Overlooked and Underestimated Benefits of Intersystemic Adjudication
I turn now to some opportunity costs of transjurisdictional adjudication—benefits,
that is, of not using transjurisdictional procedural devices. In the absence of such
procedural devices, intersystemic adjudication will be the rule; state law questions will be
resolved in federal court and federal law questions in state court.172 This means that
multiple courts may opine on the same legal issue. This may generate several benefits.
Consider first the value of having more than one court speak to a particular legal issue.
The Condorcet Jury Theorem suggests that increasing the number of decisionmakers will
well as Judge Newman’s proposal to have appeals of state law issues from federal trial courts proceed in
state appellate courts, are similarly problematic. See id. at 1739-40.
170
Cf. Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1414-16 (noting the difficulty in harmonizing three principles:
“(1) courts should avoid federal constitutional rulings when possible . . . ; (2) state courts should be the
primary interpreters of state law . . . ; and (3) no barriers should impair the availability of a federal forum
for federal claims” (footnote omitted)).
171
See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 28, at 1279 (emphasizing “the enormous benefits” of
transjurisdictional adjudication).
172
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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increase the likelihood of reaching the “correct” outcome: Assuming that each
decisionmaker has a better than even chance of choosing the correct outcome, the Jury
Theorem predicts that the choice of the majority of decisionmakers will likely be the
correct outcome, and also that this likelihood increases as the number of decisionmakers
increases.173 Here, one would treat each court as a separate decisionmaker.174 In this
sense, allowing multiple courts from multiple systems to speak on legal issues should
increase our ability to identify correct resolutions of those issues.175
Even if one rejects or questions the formal applicability of the Jury Theorem to
the context of appellate court consideration of legal questions,176 benefits remain from
having multiple courts address the same issue. First, consider the benefits that flow from
increased dialogue between state and federal courts. A multiplicity of opinions, and
potentially also of approaches, might help to open debate as to the proper way to resolve
an issue.177 It also would reduce the problematic situation of an initial court decision that
turns out to be ill-advised yet binding on all other courts.178
173

The Condorcet Jury Theorem provides that, if it is the case that each voter has better than a 50%
chance of voting for the correct outcome, then “the probability that a majority vote will select the correct
alternative approaches 1 as the number of voters gets large.” Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of
the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 327, 328 (2002). In the context of appellate court review,
the theorem suggests that, the greater the number of judges that sit on an appellate panel, the greater the
likelihood that the panel will reach the correct result. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1632-33 (2000).
174
One could also treat that each judge as a distinct decisionmaker. In that case, increasing the number
of courts will also increase the number of relevant decisionmakers, especially if (as tends to be the case for
appellate courts across judicial systems) the courts consist of more than one judge. Cf. Jacob E. Gersen &
Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676, 711-12 (2007) (arguing that, in the
context of Supreme Court review of administrative action, “the votes of agency decision-makers are also
useful inputs for Jury Theorem purposes”).
175
See Eric A. Posner & Cass. R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131 (2006)
(arguing that the Condorcet Jury Theorem offers limited support for the practice of considering the law of
other nations in determining domestic law); id. at 142 (using an example where a state court might consider
how the majority of other state courts to have considered a question have ruled).
176
See, e.g., Maxwell L. Stearns, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Judicial Decisionmaking: A Reply
to Saul Levmore, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 125, 144-46 (2002) (arguing that the theorem is of
limited applicability to the appellate court setting because appellate panels bear little resemblance to juries).
177
See David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV.
317, 324-27 (1977) (discussing “the ‘migration of ideas’ between the state and federal systems” in light of
federal diversity jurisdiction) (quoting Diversity Jurisdiction, Hearings on S. 1876 before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d CONG., 1st Sess. 162, 256
(1971) (testimony of John Frank)). As Professor Schapiro explains in the context of interpreting state
constitutional provisions: “The federal court interpretation may be helpful . . . in contributing to the
discussion of the best way to realize the underlying constitutional value. Federal judges can contribute to a
plurality of legal meaning, which provides a rich background for the investigation of fundamental rights.”
Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1417; see id. at 1417-20.
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Next, just as having multijudge panels fosters collegiality among judges,179 so too
may having courts from different systems opine on the same legal issues foster
collegiality among the various judges, courts, and judicial systems. Such collegiality
should encourage judges to consider themselves in a community of judges that reaches
beyond judicial system boundaries.180

Somewhat ironically, it also should help to

facilitate the use of transjurisdictional procedural devices in the instances in which they
are used.181
Finally, to the extent that some have argued that federal courts are of greater
quality than their state counterparts,182 intersystemic adjudication offers a benefit to state
court systems. First, state courts may become of better quality by virtue of resolving

Even if federal issues were largely decided by federal courts and state issues by state courts, there still
could be valuable dialogue between the federal and state courts. For example, insofar as many state
constitutional provisions mirror their federal counterparts, federal and state courts could debate and discuss,
through judicial opinions, the proper interpretation of similarly worded language. Missing from that
dialogue, however, would be debate and discussion as to the proper interpretation of exactly the same
provisions—that is, the dialogue would be by analogy only. At some level, then, it seems that, insofar as
the choice not to empower a single court to be ultimate arbiter of all legal questions reflects a desire for
dialogue among court systems, it is not unreasonable to see the choice as reflecting a desire to attain
maximum dialogue by allowing courts of different systems to rule on exactly the same issues.
The possible benefits of dialogue are exemplified by the Illinois Supreme Court’s recent decision to
adopt the Seventh Circuit’s understanding of Illinois conflict of laws rules as endorsing the old presumptive
rule that the law to be applied in a tort action is the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred. See
Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 N.E.2d 893, 903-04 (Ill. 2007) (citing Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton
Corp., 174 F.3d 842, 844-45 (7th Cir. 1999)).
Of course, sometimes opportunities for dialogue fall flat. Consider Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,
652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982), where the Second Circuit was faced with a
novel issue of Tennessee law. Rather than certifying the question to the Tennessee Supreme Court (or even
to the New York Court of Appeals) or trying its own hand at interpreting Tennessee law, the Second Circuit
thought it appropriate to defer to an opinion of the Sixth Circuit (within the geographic reach of which falls
Tennessee) that was on point. See id. at 283. Not only, then, was the Second Circuit a disinterested
bystander, it was truly an uninterested bystander. (I am grateful to Henry Monaghan for this point.)
178
See Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1422 (“The existence of parallel, non-intersecting lines of authority
means that a blockage or error in one will not affect the other.”); cf. John Ferejohn, Independent Judges,
Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 363 (1999) (“[T]he
development of appellate hierarchy with collegial courts at the appellate level can be understood as a
strategy to ensure that no single judge can, by her actions alone, inflict too much damage on the judiciary as
a whole, by making aberrant or overly courageous judgments.”).
179
See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA.
L. REV. 1639 (2002).
180
See Adeno Addis & Jonathan Remy Nash, On Judicial Deliberation (work-in-progress).
181
See supra p. 27 (explaining how the successful use of transjurisdictional devices depends upon good
relations between the two relevant judicial systems).
182
See supra note 122.
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matters of federal law.183 Further, this should result in an elevation in the stature of state
courts, both in their own eyes and in the eyes of others.184
To be sure, there are costs that counterbalance each of these benefits.185 The
greater the numbers of decisions handed down by non-native court systems, the greater
the likelihood for error costs. There may also be accompanying legitimacy costs. The
point, however, is not that the benefits necessarily will always outweigh the costs, but
only that the benefits (and costs) should be evaluated and weighted in each setting before
a decision is made.
D. Evaluation and Design of Transjurisdictional Procedural Devices
In this Section, I use the fuller identification of the costs and benefits of
transjurisdictional adjudication in two ways. First, I use costs and benefits as a yardstick
to evaluate commentators’ proposals for expanded use of transjurisdictional procedural
devices. Second, I use costs and benefits to suggest refinements of the existing
certification procedure and design of a new form of certification.
Evaluating commentators’ proposals.—Proposals to expand the use of transjurisdictional
devices will to some degree increase costs associated with decomposition to the extent
that they will require decomposition of more cases into constituent federal and state
issues. Decomposition, moreover, may be likely to increase friction between the court
systems, thus leading to additional costs. Proposals to expand the use of abstention are
especially problematic in that they also require decomposing factual issues.
Consider in this regard Professor Friedman’s proposal to allow litigants to make
anticipatory England reservations whenever federal claims could be brought in a federal

183

Cf. Bezanson, supra note 82, at 1126 (noting that, under Burford abstention, “[t]he quality . . . of the
state judiciary is enhanced, due . . . to the greater responsibility in the resulting adjudication of federal
matters”).
184
Cf. id. at 1117 (noting that invocations of abstention other than under Pullman “increase the
responsibility of state courts in adjudicating federal questions and thus promote greater respect for the state
judiciary”); see also id. at 1126.
185
Professor Schapiro identifies the inevitable tradeoffs of three pairs of principles that results from
increased reliance on intersystemic adjudication—and, concomitantly, decreased reliance on
transjurisdictional procedural devices: plurality versus uniformity, dialogue versus finality, and redundancy
versus hierarchical accountability. See Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1417-23.
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court, even if no federal case then is pending.186 The proposal could give rise to
substantial decomposition and legitimacy problems, stress the relationship between the
federal and state judiciaries, and inhibit dialogue between the judiciaries. As initial
matter, a litigant would be invoking England before a federal court had agreed to abstain
(let alone had a case pending, or had a formal request to abstain made).187 In order for the
litigant, or the litigant with the state court’s approval, to bind the federal court to respect
the reservation, the litigant, or the litigant and state court, would have to have the power
unilaterally to create an exception to the full faith and credit statute.188 The Court’s
opinion in San Remo makes clear that a federal court must give full preclusive effect to
the decision of a state court, even where the federal court has abstained pending the state
court’s decision.189 San Remo strongly suggests that any attempt to vest such power with
litigants, or state courts, would be inconsistent with the full faith and credit statute.190 It
also might raise legitimacy concerns.

186

See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
Professor Friedman asserts that “[i]t is impossible to see what is achieved by requiring the filing of a
federal lawsuit when that lawsuit may never prove necessary depending upon how the state court
proceedings are resolved, particularly when abstention by the federal court is entirely predictable.”
Friedman, supra note 28, at 1269. One thing that is gained is the ability of the federal court to exercise its
discretion to abstain or not. Professor Friedman’s point is more convincing to the extent that, as he puts it,
“abstention by the federal court is entirely predictable.” Id. Note, however, that the notion that the exercise
of abstention would become so predictable as to be in effect an exception to the congressional grant of
jurisdiction may raise questions arise as to the propriety of abstention without discretion. Cf. David L.
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985) (arguing that grants of federal
jurisdiction implicitly vest the federal courts with principled discretion to decline to exercise that
jurisdiction). Even if there are such cases, moreover, the universe of cases for which that is true is a small
one. See Friedman, supra note 28, at 1269 n.184.
188
The proposed expansion of England would require a parallel expansion of the implicit exception that
England imposes on the full faith and credit statute. The Supreme Court in San Remo makes suggests that,
but for a valid England reservation, the rules of res judicata require that preclusive effect be given to state
court judgments. Professor Stewart Sterk has argued that the Supreme Court’s San Remo decision interprets
the full faith and credit statute to require federal courts to accord claim preclusive and issue preclusive
effect to state court judgments. If that is true, then, at least under current law, a subsequent federal lawsuit
would be barred to the extent that the plaintiff was seen to be splitting her claims between the state and
federal lawsuits, or to be relitigating identical issues. Professor Friedman argued to the contrary (albeit
before San Remo) that, “[i]f the Supreme Court can limit the impact of preclusion in the England situation
itself, there is no reason why it cannot do so when an England reservation is made in these other
circumstances and federal litigation (if still necessary) follows immediately on the heels of state litigation.”
Friedman, supra note 28, at 1270-71. While Professor Friedman may be correct as a normative matter, it
seems fair to say as a descriptive matter that the Court’s opinion in San Remo may indicate that the Court,
at least as currently composed, is unlikely to take that step.
189
See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
190
See supra note 92.
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If (as seems likely) the power to validate an invocation of England must remain
with the federal court, then the state court would be faced with a quandary. If it is
reasonably confident that the federal court will grant abstention191 and recognize the
England reservation once a federal lawsuit is subsequently filed, then the state court
might try to restrict itself to resolving only state law matters and the facts attendant
thereto. If it is wrong and the federal court denies abstention, then the decomposition will
have been for naught and the state court presumably would have to continue to resolve
the remaining federal issues and factual matters. Even if it is right and the federal court
winds up abstaining, there is some chance that preclusion will render the reservation, and
therefore the decomposition, moot,192 and also some chance that the federal court will
disagree with the state court’s decomposition and retry certain legal and/or factual
matters.

All this uncertainty might generate legitimacy concerns and also friction

between judicial systems.193
Consider next various proposals to employ certification more frequently. I have
noted above that, of all the existing transjurisdictional procedural devices, certification
seems to work best in terms of generating relatively little friction between the state and
federal court systems. That said, there is a risk that increased reliance upon certification
will at some point inordinately tax state court systems. At some point, excessive reliance
upon transjurisdictional procedural devices by one court system at the expense of the
other might engender resentment and discourage voluntary cooperation. Either the state
courts will to their own frustration endeavor to continue to satisfy federal court
certification requests, or the state courts may begin to deny certification requests more
frequently which may frustrate the federal courts. There is some evidence that this may
be happening even under the current system.194 Moreover, recent statutory enactments—
191

Professor Friedman observes that there are cases in which “abstention by the federal court is entirely
predictable.” Friedman, supra note 28, at 1269. Even if there are cases in which abstention is indeed
“entirely” predictable, the set of such cases is not large. See supra note 187.
192
See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (explaining San Remo’s holding that preclusion
applies even where a valid England reservation is made).
193
The proposal also would decrease dialogue between the state and federal judiciaries to the extent that
state court would less frequently decide matters of federal law.
194
Indeed, there is some evidence that even now the volume of certification requests is considerably
beyond what state courts can, or at least choose to, handle. While Professor Friedman (who appears not to
endorse Professor Clark’s presumption in favor of certification, see supra note 75) asserts that “most
diversity cases do not require certification” since “their disposition rests on state law that is sufficiently
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such as the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005195—and court cases—such as the Supreme
Court’s decision in Grable & Sons196—will lead to more state law claims being heard in
federal court, and hence an enlargement of the universe of cases in which certification
might be used, and therefore presumably an increase in actual certification requests, even
under the current standard for invocation of certification. Lowering the threshold would
generate even more frequent use of the device. Thus, for example, Professor Clark’s
suggested presumption in favor of certification197 either raises concerns about the state
courts’ willingness, and capacity, to respond to much larger number of such requests, or
raises concerns about the federal courts’ ability somehow to compel state courts to
respond to certification requests, even in the face of unwillingness or perhaps even
limited capacity to accommodate a much larger number of such requests.198
Increased use of certification would also reduce dialogue between the state and
federal judiciaries insofar as the federal courts would be less likely to opine on matters of
state law. Moreover, increased reliance on certification would combine with the increase
in opportunity, resulting from the Court’s decision in Grable, to employ certification in
cases in which federal and state law intertwine, to present more problems of case
decomposition. Finally, increased reliance on certification would increase the possibility
of bias, and of the perception of bias.
Judge Newman’s suggestion to funnel appeals of federal issues to federal courts
of appeals and state issues to state appellate courts199 is more sensitive to the problem of
friction between the judicial systems: Judge Newman’s suggestion would, roughly at
least, offset the increase in state court appellate workload by taking away from state court
appellate dockets appeals involving federal issues. His approach, in other words,

settled,” Friedman, supra note 28, at 1276, a limited empirical study presented by Judge Alex Kozinski in a
dissenting opinion suggests that the California Supreme Court “has rejected one-third of the cases [that the
Ninth Circuit has] certified to it since the [state certification] rule went into effect.” Kremen v. Cohen, 325
F.3d 1035, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see id. at 1054 app. (displaying a table
summarizing dispositions of Ninth Circuit certification requests to the California Supreme Court).
195
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
196
See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
197
See supra text accompanying notes 32-40.
198
Here I mean to refer to the capacity of the federal courts to force state courts to respond to certified
questions either by truly compelling them (a power which is in doubt), see Nash, supra note 16, at 1690-91
n.74, or by strong suggestion or other methods of attempted coercion grounded in power disparity.
199
See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
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endeavors to balance workload and responsibility between judicial systems, which seems
likely to foster cooperation and comity. The proposal does less well with respect to
preserving dialogue between the state and federal judiciaries, and avoiding the difficulties
of case decomposition. While Judge Newman’s suggestion would preserve some
dialogue—between federal trial courts and state appellate courts, and between state trial
courts and federal appellate courts—it would eliminate federal appellate courts from
dialogue over state law and state appellate courts and supreme courts from dialogue over
federal law.200 Judge Newman’s proposal would also require the decomposition of large
numbers of cases, and as a result generate sizable costs.
Judge Calabresi’s suggestion for a modified certification procedure is also sensitive to
the role of state courts: Even though Judge Calabresi’s proposal would lead to increased
use of certification, because he calls as a prerequisite for federal courts to draft an opinion
tackling the state law questions to be certified, the state high courts may feel freer to
reject certification requests unless the federal court opinion in fact gets the answers
wrong. In this sense, Judge Calabresi’s proposal positions federal courts as subordinate to
the state high court.201 By requiring federal courts to offer a suggested interpretation of
200

It might be argued that vibrant and effective dialogue between judicial systems does not require the
participation of every court at every level. Even now, for example, the Supreme Court does not hear
appeals of state law resolutions by state courts unless the determination is antecedent to a question or
federal law, or is suspected of having been devised so as to evade or cheat federal law or federal judicial
review. See supra text accompanying notes 114-115. It also will almost always decline to review federal
court determinations of state law as a matter of efficient allocation of judicial resources. See Leavitt v. Jane
L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996) (Supreme Court granted certiorari “solely to review what purports to be an
application of state law” because “the alternative is allowing blatant federal-court nullification of state
law”); see generally Nash, supra note 139, at 990-91. Thus, the Supreme Court generally does not
participate in dialogue on matters of state law.
That said, while the presence of one additional participant in a dialogue may be of negligible benefit, cf.
Saul Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets and the Role of Regulation: Lessons from the Iowa Electronic
Markets and the Hollywood Stock Exchange, 28 J. CORP. L. 589, 597 n.30 (2003) (noting the “declining
marginal gains in accuracy from increased numbers of voters under the Condorcet Jury Theorem”), the
benefit of the inclusion of entire tiers of courts would seem to be potentially great. More importantly,
experience indicates that state courts often adopt reasoning advanced by federal appellate courts and vice
versa. See, e.g., supra note 177.
201
Judge Calabresi explains:
[T]he intermediate federal courts should be no more than the ‘Appellate Division for Diversity
Cases.’ We should think of ourselves as an intermediate state court whose function it is to decide
provisionally, and let the highest court of the state ultimately determine state law.. . . What
federal judges should do, if state law is uncertain, is write an opinion which says what we think
that law ought to be. We should write an opinion of the same sort that the state’s appellate
division would write. And then we should certify, so that the New York Court of Appeals is able
to decide (1) not to take the case, if it thinks that we are right, or if it is not ready to take the issue
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state law that the state court could consider in deciding whether to grant the certification
request, the proposal would also tend to preserve dialogue between the state and federal
judiciaries as compared to proposals to expand the use of certification in its current form.
Just as the Supreme Court’s discretion to grant certiorari review is often used with an eye
to fostering dialogue among lower state and federal courts on federal law issues,202 so too
would Judge Calabresi’s modified certification procedure tend to foster such a dialogue
with respect to state law issues.
Refinement and design.—The full consideration of costs and benefits can also be an aid
in refining existing transjurisdictional procedural devices. For example, despite
certification’s good ability to harness the federal and state courts’ cooperative spirit,
some changes to that device might be considered. First, as I have noted above, while
Pullman abstention does give state courts the opportunity to resolve contested matters of
state law,203 its genesis is a desire to allow federal courts to avoid unnecessary decision of
difficult constitutional questions204; indeed, Pullman abstention is not permitted solely to
allow state court resolution of matters of state law.205 Theoretically, the use of
certification, as a streamlined form of abstention, should to some degree incorporate this
point. Even if the lower costs of certification give that procedure a lower invocation
threshold, and even if that lower threshold allows its use even where there is no federal
issue in a case, one would think that the presence of a complex federal question whose
up, or if it just doesn't want to bother to take it at that time; or (2) to take it, if it likes, in exactly
the same way it does cases brought up (on certiorari, essentially) from the appellate division.
If federal judges did that, if we had that structural view of our role, then we would not be
insulted when the New York Court of Appeals declines certification. Now, when the New York
Court of Appeals declines certification, some federal judges walk around saying, “What did they
do to us? After all, we are the Second Circuit, they should listen to us!” My view is exactly the
opposite. We have indicated how we would decide something, or simply explicated our doubts on
the issue. If the state’s highest court doesn’t want to take it, great! That gives us authority to
impose our view of state law, provisionally, until the highest court of the state decides to resolve
the question.
Calabresi, supra note 41, at 1301-02. (One might query, as Professor Bradford Clark has to me, whether
such federal court opinions run the risk of being seen as merely advisory.)
202
See Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s
Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 716 (1984) (extolling the virtue of having the
Supreme Court decline to address a legal issue while it “percolate[s]” in the lower courts).
203
See Bezanson, supra note 82, at 1114.
204
See id. at 1112-13.
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decision might be avoided by resolution of a matter of state law would weigh in favor of
the use of certification, while certification would be less likely absent such an issue.206
A second suggested refinement to current certification procedure arises from the
possibility that the use of certification may empower state courts to render biased
decisions, or at least that its use may give rise to such a perception. One answer to this
problem would be to make explicit that the federal court need not follow the state court’s
responses to certified questions in every case. Specifically, the federal court could make
clear that it need not follow a state court’s response when there is adequate evidence that
the court has responded in a biased way.
One might argue that Erie requires the federal court simply to apply the state
court’s ruling, but it must be that bias is an exception. The very premise of diversity
jurisdiction suggests that federal courts should not decide cases exactly as the state court
would if doing so would entail being biased against or in favor of parties on a
geographical basis.207
In the end, it is unlikely that many state courts will be sufficiently explicit as to
reliance upon bias.208 Thus, it would also make sense to have federal courts announce
they will be disinclined against certifying questions to state courts where there is
evidence that prior responses to certified questions may have been motivated by bias. In
making such determinations, federal courts could look to see how frequently, and how
and why, state courts have seen fit to overrule or limit earlier responses to certified
questions that purported to be general statements of law. Such an approach would offer
205

Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943) (federal court cannot abstain solely on the ground
that state law issue is novel or confusing).
206
See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
207
The Court’s ability to review purportedly state law decisions where the state law decision is couched
in a way so as to insulate it against federal review, see supra text accompanying notes 114-115, also
supports the validity of this notion.
An extension of Professor Schapiro’s argument that “courts may make mistakes in their interpretation of
the law,” Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1413, provides further theoretical underpinning. One can argue that a
state court of last resort may err in interpreting state law: Specifically, a ruling in which bias affects a state
court’s resolution of a legal issue is a case in which the court errs in interpreting the law, and, analogously,
a case in which bias is perceived to have affected the resolution (even if in fact it did not) is a case in which
it is perceived that the state court erred in interpreting the law. Perhaps federal courts should have some
freedom to consider such possibilities.
208
While Justice Neely was explicit about his goal of favoring in-state plaintiffs against out-of-state
companies while still on the bench, see supra note 127, one would not expect many court opinions to
exhibit similar candor.
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dual benefits: It would decrease the likelihood of certification where bias is, or is
perceived to be, a real possibility, and it would also create a prospective incentive for
states not to rely on bias in answering certified questions.
VI.

CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have highlighted the difficulties inherent in having cases traverse

the divide between judicial systems. While many commentators advocate increased
reliance on transjurisdictional procedural devices, the commentators overlook or
undervalue the costs that these devices may introduce. Reliance upon disparities in
power, bias, and the challenge of decomposing cases into constituent issues are
potentially problematic for the introduction of new devices as well as expanded use of
existing ones as, indeed, experience with existing transjurisdictional procedural devices
confirms. A fuller appreciation of these costs, and of the potential benefits of
intersystemic adjudication, makes it easier to evaluate proposals to expand the use of
transjurisdictional procedural devices and, indeed, to design new devices and to refine
existing ones.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Jonathan R. Nash
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
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